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PREFACE 
 
 
The Glucksman Institute for Research in Securities Markets awards fellowships each year to 
outstanding second year Stern MBA students to work on independent research projects under a 
faculty member's supervision. Four research projects completed by the Glucksman Fellows of 
2005-2006 are included in this special issue of the Finance Department Working Paper Series. 
These papers focus on important topics in empirical financial economics.  
 
Judson Coplan, under the supervision of William Greene, examines the recent slowdown in U.S. 
sales of DVDs and the resulting effects on movie studio and media conglomerate profits. Ben 
Macdonald, under the direction of Richard Levich, compares the timeliness of rating changes 
across the major rating agencies in three major capital markets: the United States, Canada and 
Australia. Shivanker Saxena, under the supervision of Rangarajan K. Sundaram, explores the 
phenomenon of high premiums at which ADRs from India trade in the US compared to the 
prices of the underlying equities in India. Joe Ryan, under the direction of Yakov Amihud, 
examines activist investor campaigns and attempts to measure whether their efforts increase 
shareholder value for other shareholders. These papers, reflecting the research effort of four 
outstanding Stern MBA students, are summarized in more detail in the Table of Contents on the 
next two pages. 
 
        
 
 
      William L. Silber, Director    
      Glucksman Institute     
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I. Introduction 
 Development of the DVD (Digital Versatile Disc, formerly known as the Digital 
Video Disc) was perhaps the most significant innovation in entertainment since color 
television.  DVD players and pre-recorded films penetrated U.S. homes at a rate faster 
than any consumer electronics device on record.1  Movie studios realized unprecedented 
revenue growth, with DVD sales of movies rivaling and even exceeding corresponding 
box office receipts.  Furthermore, the new digital format neatly replaced the quickly 
aging medium of VHS, while offering studios a far higher profit margin than its analog 
predecessor (66% vs. 45%)2.  In 2003, a mere eight years after the invention of the DVD, 
it appeared that Hollywood had found a high growth machine for the next decade. 
 Then, suddenly, the trends shifted.  In 2005, unit growth in U.S. shipments of 
DVD films and TV shows fell to just 9% year-over-year, compared to 50% growth in 
both 2003 and 2004.3  As prices fell, DVD sell-through (i.e. sales to end consumers on a 
buy-to-own basis) in dollar figures grew just 5%.  When including the shrinking VHS 
market, overall consumer spending on home video actually shrank by 1% from 2004-
2005.4 
                                                 
1 Data from Consumer Electronics Association eBrain Market Research statistics, dating 
back to 1954. 
2 According to a 2004 study by Jessica Reif-Cohen, media and entertainment Research 
Analyst at Merrill Lynch. 
3 Data and chart from the Digital Entertainment Group, a nonprofit trade consortium. 
4 Data from Bernstein Equity Research team. 
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Sales trends for DVD hardware took a similar turn in 2005.  The NPD group 
analyzed retail sales on Black Friday5 2005 vs. 2004, showing that DVD players 
experienced double-digit declines on par with CRT televisions and portable CD players. 
Retail Sales Growth in Consumer Electronics:
Black Friday 2005 vs. 2004
Unit Growth Rev. Growth
LCDs over 26" 1008.3% 556.4%
Plasma TVs 210.0% 154.2%
LCDs under 26" 393.9% 133.1%
MP3 Players 194.1% 126.4%
Satellite Radios 203.1% 101.0%
DVD Recorders 163.9% 56.1%
Portable DVD Players 48.3% 5.8%
Camcorders 0.9% -0.7%
Direct View TVs (Regular CRT) -26.9% -29.0%
DVD Players -44.0% -45.2%
CRT Rear Projection -42.5% -51.5%
Personal CD Players -49.7% -52.7%  
                                                 
5 Black Friday, one of the major U.S. holiday shopping days, falls on the day after 
Thanksgiving every year. 
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 A number of theories explain this rapid and abrupt deceleration in DVD sales 
growth, including illegal piracy, new technology substitution such as video-on-demand 
and pay-per-view (Exhibits 1 & 2), and the growing popularity of rent-by-mail services 
like Netflix (Exhibit 3).  While these are all legitimate and likely contributing factors, this 
paper seeks to explain the changing growth trends through a market penetration 
hypothesis.  By examining home video sales data, academic research, and historical 
trends in consumer electronics, the data presents a life cycle driven theory for the rapidly 
slowing DVD business.  The popularity and understanding of this view is growing in the 
entertainment industry, and this paper seeks to quantify and clearly illustrate a concern 
that was recently articulated by Steve Beeks, President of Lionsgate Entertainment: “We 
all anticipated the maturing of the DVD business, and the corresponding slow-growth 
business that it would become, but it happened more quickly than we had anticipated.” 
 
II. A Brief History of Home Video 
 
Sony introduced the first commercially successful videocassette recorder (VCR) 
in 1975.  It was a bulky and expensive Betamax machine for which there was little 
prerecorded software at the time.  Just 11 years later, movie studios “generated more in 
domestic wholesale gross revenues from [sales and rentals of] home video (about $2 
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billion) than from theatrical ($1.6 billion) sources.”6  The home video market continued 
to grow through the 1990s, becoming the largest single component of studio revenues 
alongside theatrical receipts, sales to TV networks (i.e. Free TV), pay TV revenues, and 
licensing fees.  By 2004, home video sales accounted for 51% of studio top lines.7  By 
2005, home video profits at the major U.S. media conglomerates made up as much as 
35% of total firm operating income.8 
Studio Revenue Breakdown, 2004
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6 Vogel, pg. 103. 
7 Kagan Research estimates, based on $45.6 billion in 2004 worldwide studio revenue. 
8 Home Video estimates from Bernstein Research (revenue data) and Goldman Sachs 
Research (operating income data). 
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 During this period, Hollywood also began to shift its pricing model for home 
video products.  In the late 1970s and through the 1980s, “rental pricing” meant that 
studios charged exorbitant prices (up to $100 per VHS tape) to rental shops such as 
Blockbuster Video.  These retailers would then loan the movie out as many times as 
possible in order to recoup their initial outlay and eventually turn a profit.  The early 
1990s ushered in the “revenue sharing” model, in which studios sold VHS tapes to the 
same retailers for far less (as low as $5 per unit), but shared in the resulting rental 
revenues. 
The DVD era of the late 1990s and early 2000s led to today’s “sell-through” 
model.  This system focuses on the consumer buy-to-own market rather than the video 
rental market.  Studios charge retailers like Wal-Mart anywhere from $10-$30 per disc, 
and Wal-Mart then sells the products directly to consumers.  These changes in pricing 
models have drastically affected consumer behavior.  In fact, sell-through purchases now 
dominate rental purchases, making up over 70% of home video sales in 2005 (Exhibit 4).  
The emergence of the sell-through model also coincided with the decline in sales of pre-
recorded VHS tapes.  Exhibit 5 illustrates the breakdown of all home video sales (sell-
through and rental) between DVD and VHS tapes, with the latter representing just 6% of 
2005 home video revenues in the U.S. 
 
III. Rise of the DVD – The Hardware-Software Connection 
 Sales of DVDs, like sales of VHS tapes, depend upon customers possessing the 
hardware equipment to view the content at home.  Therefore, growth trends for discs 
should reflect growth patterns for DVD hardware (i.e. players), while trends for VHS 
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tapes should mirror those for VCRs.  Data from the Digital Entertainment Group9 and 
Adams Media Research confirm this hypothesis, as the unit shipment and growth charts 
below indicate similar sell-through trends for DVDs/DVD players and VHS tapes/VCRs. 
 
U.S. Unit Shipments: DVDs vs. DVD Players, 1997-2005
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U.S. Unit Shipments: DVDs vs. DVD Players, 1997-2005
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9 Note: The charts above include sales data for DVDs from the Digital Entertainment 
Group (DEG).  Figures include set-top and portable DVD players, Home-Theater-in-a-
Box systems, TV/DVD and DVD/VCR combination players. 
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U.S. Unit Shipments: VHS Tapes vs. VCRs, 1981-2004
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This link between software and hardware sales is prevalent for audio products as 
well.  The chart below indicates that shipments of music CDs closely mirror shipments of 
CD players.10  This makes intuitive sense, as both video and audio markets share similar 
characteristics of upfront hardware purchases followed by multiple software purchases.  
Furthermore, both products exhibit the hump-shaped growth curve common to consumer 
durables.  This will be discussed further in section five. 
U.S. Unit Shipments: CDs vs. CD Players, 1983-2004
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
U
ni
ts
 (m
ill
io
ns
)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
U
ni
ts
 (m
ill
io
ns
)
CD Unit Shipments CD Player Shipments (Right Axis)  
                                                 
10 Data from the Recording Industry Association of America (CD units) and Consumer 
Electronics Association eBrain Market Research statistics (CD players). 
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IV. Rise of the DVD – Historical Comparisons of Hardware Penetration 
 Section 3 illustrated the close relationship between video players and discs, 
whereby hardware growth seemingly dictates the direction and magnitude of software 
growth.  Therefore, Hollywood executives should be able to simply forecast sales of 
DVD players in order to gauge growth trends in DVD software.11  Why, then, were so 
many of these same executives shocked when sales of DVD movies slowed dramatically 
in 2005? 
 The answer lies in the remarkably rapid penetration of DVD players across the 
U.S.  Few people could have predicted that DVD players would reach over 70% of 
American TV households a mere six years after commercial introduction.  VCRs 
achieved this same penetration rate in twelve years, CD players required 14 years, cell 
phones 18 years, and PCs nearly a quarter century (below).12 
Penetration of Consumer Electronics, 1978-2004
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11 There is research that shows the reverse effect of complementarity between DVD 
software availability and subsequent DVD player purchases, most notably by Pinar 
Karaca-Mandic at University of California at Berkeley.  Nevertheless, the relationship 
still stands between discs and players, whereby hardware sales and software sales move 
in tandem. 
12 Data from Consumer Electronics Association eBrain Market Research statistics. 
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The FCC compiled a similar chart of consumer product penetration, dating back 
to 1876 (Exhibit 6).  It is important to note that since the mid-20th century, rates of 
penetration have increased steadily for new or replacement technologies, a topic that will 
be addressed in section five.  Although DVD players are not included in the FCC chart, 
there is no other consumer product that matches DVD’s 70% penetration in seven years.  
Furthermore, no other product has moved up the lower segment of the penetration curve 
as quickly as DVD players.  Exhibit 7 shows that DVD hardware was in 25% of U.S. 
homes just 5 years after the technology was invented, displaying an outstanding rate of 
growth early in the product life cycle.  A consumer survey conducted in December 2005 
by IPSOS Public Affairs showed that DVD Players are now in over 80% of U.S. homes, 
eclipsing cell phone and PC penetration (below). 
Consumer Electronics Penetration, Dec. 2005
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There are numerous reasons for the rapid penetration of DVD hardware, such as 
inclusion of DVD players in PCs and gaming consoles, an easy-to-grasp technology 
transition from VCRs, and rapidly falling prices for the players themselves.  Various 
research models address these issues and shed light on the factors behind general 
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consumer product growth. The next section presents academic insights to explain the 
meteoric rise of the DVD, while also offering a glimpse into the future of the format. 
 
V. Rise of the DVD – Academic Models 
Everett Rogers and Innovation Diffusion 
The most well known research on technological adoption comes from Everett 
Rogers, who published his first edition of Diffusion of Innovations in 1962.  In this book, 
Rogers formalized the theory that technological innovations spread through society in an 
S-Curve of cumulative adoption.  Various consumer groups along this curve are 
categorized as innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, or laggards, based 
on their time of adoption and personal characteristics (below). 
 
 The S-Curve model not only identifies adopter groups, it also provides insights 
into product growth over the course of the life cycle.  For example, the S-shaped curve of 
adoption “takes off” in the range of 10-20 percent adoption.  Rogers identifies this 
segment as the “heart of the diffusion process,” after which point it is often impossible to 
stop further spread.  Conversely, diffusion growth slows in the 70-80 percent range, as 
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fewer remaining individuals adopt the innovation.  These theories are consistent across 
numerous consumer products, and modern research confirms that, “U.S. consumer 
adoption rates begin to flatten dramatically at penetration levels between 65% and 
80%.”13 
Rogers also conducted research that examined rates of adoption, defined as “the 
relative speed with which an innovation is adopted by members of a social system.”14  
This rate is typically measured by the number of people who adopt a product each year, 
and it serves as an indicator of the steepness of the adoption curve for a particular 
innovation.  Rogers’ writings indicate five variables that explain “from 49-87 percent of 
the variance in adoption rates”: relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, 
and observability.  These variables are classified under the title Perceived Attributes of 
Innovations, and DVD player technology scores highly across all these categories.  
Rogers also offers four additional variables, including type of innovation-decision, 
communication channels, nature of social system, and extent of change agents’ 
promotion efforts.  Again, DVDs score well in all these areas that display a linear 
relationship to rate of adoption (Exhibit 8). 
 
The Bass Model 
Professor Frank M. Bass from Purdue University used Rogers’ insights to develop 
a quantitative product growth model for consumer durables.  First proposed in 1969, the 
model identified two adopter categories; imitators, who are influenced by word-of-mouth 
communication (internal influence), and innovators, who are influenced by mass media 
                                                 
13 Nathanson, pg. 4. 
14 Rogers, pg. 206. 
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communication (external influence).  The Bass Model converts this concept to a 
quantitative form, in which each influence is represented by a variable.  The former 
variable is referred to as the “coefficient of imitation” while the latter is referred to as the 
“coefficient of innovation.” 
This model has been used to accurately predict and explain product growth trends 
over the past 40 years.  Critics claim that Bass’ work is overly simplistic, as it considers 
only two adopter categories and uses past data for comparable products as the basis for 
future predictions.  Nevertheless, the Bass Model illustrates a growth pattern (Exhibit 9) 
very similar to that proposed by Rogers and entirely consistent with the eight years of 
data available from the DVD hardware industry. 
 
The Takeoff Model 
Research by Professor Peter Golder (NYU Stern School of Business) and Gerard 
Tellis (USC Marshall School of Business) provides additional insight into rates of 
product adoption.  Their “takeoff model” predicts the distinct point in the product life 
cycle at which the transition occurs from introductory stage to growth stage.  This is 
represented as an elbow-shaped discontinuity in the sales curve, typically with an 
“average sales increase of over 400%.”  This feature is often ignored in diffusion models, 
which tend to depict adoption of new consumer durables with smooth curves.  As 
mentioned earlier, Everett Rogers made brief reference to this phenomenon, broadly 
characterizing product takeoff as the time between 10-20 percent penetration. 
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By following Golder and Tellis’ model, we can show that DVD player takeoff 
occurred in early 1999, just two years after commercialization and at a rate far greater 
than takeoff for VCRs (below).15 
U.S. Product Takeoff: DVD Players vs. VCRs
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In fact, DVD player sales have far outpaced historical sales averages for new 
consumer durables, as calculated by Golder and Tellis (below).16 
Average Sales History of Really New Consumer Durables
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15 Data from Consumer Electronics Association eBrain Market Research statistics. 
16 Golder P. and G. Tellis. (2004, Vol. 23, No. 2), pg. 213. 
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Two years following commercial introduction, DVD hardware shipments eclipsed 
500,000 units per quarter at a growth rate of 300% on a year-over-year basis.  By 
comparison, Golder and Tellis found that the average time to takeoff for 16 post-World 
War II categories is six years.  To understand DVD’s rapid movement into the growth 
stage, it is important to examine the primary drivers of takeoff.  The research identifies 
three primary independent variables (price, year of introduction, market penetration) and 
two control variables (product-specific characteristics and economic conditions).  As in 
the Rogers model, we find that DVD technology exceeds the averages for each of these 
variables, leading to a remarkably early and strong takeoff for the product (Exhibit 10). 
 
Evolving Process Model for new Product Sales 
 The three previous academic models explained rates of hardware adoption in the 
U.S., however it is worth examining a relatively unrelated theory that applies to DVD 
software purchasing.  Rather than confront the early growth segment of the life cycle, 
Professor Peter Fader at Wharton considers repeat purchases that occur after consumers 
gain more experience with a product.  This evolving process model assumes that 
consumers become more regular in their buying behavior over time, moving from an 
initial stage of exponential purchasing to a steady state.  While Fader’s model deals 
primarily with the regularity of timing between purchases, there is significant evidence 
that also shows a decrease in buying frequency for DVDs. 
 A USA Today article from early 2005 claimed, “if you look at the average 
number of DVDs bought by the DVD homes, the peak of 25 was in 1998; the past few 
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years it has been about 15.”17  According to Dan Ernst, a media analyst with Soleil 
Securities, in 1999 the average owner of a DVD player was buying 20 DVDs each year.  
By mid-2005, he wrote that the number had dropped to about 14 DVDs sold per 
household per year.18  Holly Wagner, senior editor with Home Media Retailing, offered 
anecdotal evidence, “Now that everyone has a DVD player, they aren’t rushing out to buy 
the first of everything.”19 
It appears that as the market matures for DVD players, household purchasing of 
DVDs has cooled as the novelty and excitement of technological adoption wears off. 
 
VI. The Next S-Curve? 
 Movie studios and home video executives are beginning to realize that the golden 
goose of DVD is near its end.  Scott Hettrick, editor-in-chief of trade publications Video 
Business and DVD Exclusive said it best, “The DVD market matured much more quickly 
than anyone expected…there is little growth left.”20  DVD hardware sped up the diffusion 
S-Curve more quickly than any other consumer product in American history.  As a result, 
sales of DVD players and discs came to a screeching halt well before the industry 
predicted.  Perhaps the largest factor, as described in Golder and Tellis’ takeoff model, 
was falling prices for hardware (below) that spurred rapid adoption in the U.S.  In their 
follow-up research,21 the two professors found significant evidence that product 
                                                 
17 Snider, M. (2005, January 5). DVD Continues Spinning Success. USA Today. 
18 Fost, D. (2005, September 5). Consumers Changing DVD Buying Habits. San 
Francisco Chronicle. 
19 Same as above. 
20 Snider, M. (2006, January 4). Video Slips as DVD Market Matures; Hopes Pinned on 
‘High-Def.’ USA Today. 
21 Golder P. and G. Tellis. (2004, Vol. 23, No. 2), pg. 213. 
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slowdown is positively correlated with adoption, specifically that “every 1% increase in 
penetration is associated with a 3.9% increase in the probability of a slowdown.”22  As 
Mr. Hettrick stated in early 2006, “The industry shot itself in the foot by lowering DVD 
prices too much and too quickly.” 
ASPs of Consumer Electronics Hardware, 1980-2004
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 Golder and Tellis’ work on product slowdown has other important implications 
for the fading future of the DVD business.  The researchers discovered that products with 
large sales increases at takeoff tend to have larger sales declines at slowdown, an 
ominous portent for DVDs.  Additionally, the two found that leisure-enhancing products 
(e.g. DVD players, color TVs, VCRs) have a negative effect on the duration of the 
growth stage. 
The multi-billion dollar question in Hollywood is, of course, what’s next?  Online 
downloads and pay-per-view purchasing offer a glimpse into a disc-less future, but the 
industry is placing its high-growth bets on High Definition DVD.  This upgrade to 
                                                 
22 Golder and Tellis define slowdown as the first year, of two consecutive years after 
takeoff, in which sales are lower than the highest previous sales.  Although this point has 
not yet arrived for the DVD industry, it could very well occur in 2007 or 2008. 
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existing DVD technology offers increased storage space that allows for even higher-
resolution video and a wealth of additional content, in addition to superior profit margins. 
However, as this paper illustrates, there are numerous variables that affect the 
success of a new consumer product.  Companies must work together to introduce a 
technology that possesses Rogers’ key ingredients and has strong takeoff potential.  At 
the same time, content producers and hardware manufacturers should avoid excessive 
supply-side increases that lead to rapid price reductions and shorter product life cycles.  
On a positive note, recent research into new product development identified demand 
growth as a second leading factor in successful launches.23  Agarwal and Bayus found 
that, “outward shifting supply and demand curves lead to market takeoff.” Thus, firm 
entry and activity geared towards increasing product quality may be just as important as 
price declines in determining success.  This is certainly good news for product managers, 
and it suggests that, “sales growth does not have to necessarily come at the expense of 
compressed profit margins.” 
If the home video industry can strike the right balance between innovation and 
supply-side management, perhaps there is another round of growth ahead.  Just in time to 
replace the relatively young – yet faltering – DVD. 
 
                                                 
23 Agarwal, R. and B. Bayus. 
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Exhibit 1 
Video-On-Demand (VOD) Usage
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Source: ICR CENTRIS Omnibus Survey (conducted 11/11/05-11/16/05) 
Base used is total digital cable households where Video-On-Demand is available 
 
Exhibit 2 
Video-On-Demand (VOD) Growth, 1999-2004
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Source: Nielsen Media Research, Adams Media Research, Video Store Magazine 
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Exhibit 3 
U.S. Netflix Subscribers, 2001-2005
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Source: Netflix company data 
 
Exhibit 4 
U.S. Home Video Sales: Sell-Through vs. Rental, 2001-2005
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Source: The Digital Entertainment Group, 2006 
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Exhibit 5 
U.S. Home Video Sales: DVD vs. VHS, 2001-2005
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Source: The Digital Entertainment Group, 2006 
 
Exhibit 6 
Penetration of Consumer Technologies, 1876-19
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Source: For "households" (1876-1900) and "homes with electricity" (1908-11, 1913-16, 1918-20), FCC 
staff estimates based on Census Bureau information.  For CD players, Consumer Electronics Manufacturers 
Association data (June 1999).  For Direct Broadcast Satellite, THE SATELLITE REPORT 1999, by Global 
Satellite Research, C.E. Unterberg, Towbin (1999).  For all other data, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES, by US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, 
1979, 1982-83, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1998) and HISTORICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, by US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census (1975). 
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Exhibit 7 
Penetration Rates of Popular Technologies, from Time of 
Invention
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Consumer Electronics Association 
 
Exhibit 8 
Variables Determining the Rate of Adoption of Innovations
DVD Diffusion in the U.S.
I. Perceived Attributes of Innovation
1. Relative advantage Substantial benefits over analog technology: improved sound and 
picture, more content, fast scene selection, smaller physical footprint.  
Economic benefit of falling prices for players and discs over time, 
becoming even cheaper than VCRs and VHS tapes.
2. Compatibility Single format for DVD reduced consumer confusion and facilitated 
production of hardware and peripherals (i.e. avoided costly VHS-
Beta war).  DVD falls neatly within the home entertainment product 
landscape and is compatible with American beliefs regarding 
technological innovation and improved quality of life.
3. Complexity Relatively easy to understand and use.  DVDs are also very similar in 
function to preceding analog VCR technology (i.e. playback, FF, 
Rewind, etc).
4. Trialability Wide range of trial options, including friends, neighbors, and 
electronics stores.
5. Observability Benefits of DVD innovation are clearly observable, in the form of 
drastically improved video resolution, quick access to content, and 
superb sound.
II. Type of Innovation-Decision Individual, optional purchase decision does not require groups or 
higher authority.
III. Communication Channels Well organized mass media channels plus widespread interpersonal 
communication (i.e. word of mouth).
IV. Nature of the Social System Technologically advanced, with highly interconnected communication 
network.
V. Extent of Change Agents' Promotion Efforts Coordinated advertising and marketing from electronics and 
entertainment industries.  
 
Source: Everett Rogers Diffusion of Innovations
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Exhibit 9 
Bass Model Formulation 
 
Cumulative number of adopters = Nt = Nt−1 + p(m − Nt−1) + q Nt−1m (m − Nt−1)  
m = number of people who will adopt (i.e. total market size) 
N(t-1) = number who have already adopted at a point in time t 
p = tendency to adopt (coefficient of innovation – external factors such as media coverage) 
q = likelihood of adoption (coefficient of imitation – internal factors such as word of 
mouth/social contagion) 
 
Analytical Structure of the Bass New Product Diffusion Model 
 
 
Source: Mahajan, V., Muller, E., & Bass, F.M. (1990, Vol. 54, No. 1). New Product Diffusion Models in 
Marketing: A Review and Directions for Research. Journal of Marketing, pg. 4. 
 
Exhibit 10 
 
Variables Determining Takeoff
I. Independent Variables Golder & Tellis Comments Average Takeoff DVD Takeoff
1. Price "Probably the single most important factor." To standardize 
measurements of price, G&T divided the price of each product in 
each period by that product's initial price.
Price = 63% of 
introductory 
price.
Price = 58% of 
introductory 
price.
2. Year of Introduction G&T posit that the introductory stage of the product life cycle is 
shortening over time, and takeoff occurs earlier than in the past.  
Thus, they expect year of introduction to be positively correlated 
with takeoff.
Time from 
introduction to 
takeoff = 6 years
Time from 
introduction to 
takeoff = 2 years
3. Market Penetration Defined as the percentage of households that have purchased 
the new product.  Everett Rogers' research on diffusion 
indicates a distinct threshold (2.5%) at which products move to 
mass market. Plus, availability of complementary products implies
relationship between market penetration and takeoff.
Penetration at 
takeoff = 1.7%
Penetration at 
takeoff = 2.1%
II. Control Variables
1. Product-Specific 
Characteristics
These include type of product (leisure, time-saving, electronic 
good) and whether sales depend on externalities such as 
software.
Not significant DVD is an 
electronic good
2. Economic Conditions These include GNP, total number of households, consumer 
sentiment.
Not significant Strong GDP 
growth, budget 
surplus, and high 
consumer 
sentiment may be 
factors  
 
Source: Golder and Tellis “Will It Ever Fly? Modeling the Takeoff of Really New Consumer Durables.”
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I. Summary 
Rating Agencies occupy a powerful position in capital markets across the world. Their 
credit ratings of Sovereigns, Corporates and Structured Finance deals can have a strong affect on 
the cost and ability to borrow for many organisations. Previous studies have quantified the effect 
of rating changes on the price of bonds in the secondary market. Event studies have shown a 
marked influence on price, particularly when a credit downgrade is announced. This effect is 
even more pronounced when the rating downgrade crosses the Investment/Speculative rating 
boundary.  
However, the timeliness of ratings across agencies is still an unanswered question. 
Making the assumption that a rating change brings new information to the market, does one 
rating agency consistently make rating changes earlier? 
This paper will compare the timeliness of rating changes across the major rating agencies 
in three major capital markets: the United States, Canada and Australia. 
 
II. Introduction and Motivations 
The concept of rating the creditworthiness of companies and individuals has been around 
for many years. In the 1860s, Henry Varnum Poor began publishing financial information about 
railroad and canal companies. By the late 1800’s, R. G. Dun & Co had a network of 
representatives that reported on merchants and companies around the USA.  
John Moody provided the first corporate rating for a railway bond in 1909, followed by 
Standard Statistics in 1916 and Poor’s publishing in 1919. Standard Statistics and Poors merged 
in 1941 to form Standard & Poor’s. Fitch rated its first deal in 1924. 
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Coverage of Municipal Bonds followed in the 1940s, Sovereign Ratings became common in the 
1980s and 1990s, and rating of Structured Finance deals also began in the 1980s with residential 
mortgage backed securities. 
The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) created a regulatory category of 
“Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Agency” or NRSRO in 1975, and accredited these 
three major bond rating agencies. In the following decade, 4 new agencies were accredited, but 
by 1992, mergers led to only three major names remaining: Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and 
Fitch. 
More recently, in 2003, the SEC accredited Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) and 
A.M. Best with the NRSRO designation, so that the US market currently features 5 NRSROs.  
The corporate rating industry also exists in a number of other countries, particularly 
Australia, Canada and the UK, and it is growing in many other locations throughout Europe and 
Asia. The large US based rating firms tend to dominate the markets (for example, S&P bought 
the largest rating agency in Australia, and recently took a majority interest in the largest in India). 
Following the recent corporate collapses of companies like Enron and WorldCom, there 
has been renewed discussion as to the effectiveness of ratings agencies. There are a number of 
different ways that their effectiveness can be judged – with the most obvious metric being an 
examination of occurrence of default for companies that have been assessed at a particular rating 
level. 
Rating agencies state that their analysis is based on all available public information, and 
they cannot be expected to accurately identify a corporate fraud. This somewhat mitigates the 
argument that they missed some of the recent corporate failures.  
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So the next reasonable question is how effective are the rating agencies in predicting 
corporate distress due to normal economic conditions and competition? 
There are a number of different dimensions that can be tested. Rating agencies define a 
hierarchy of rating levels or “notches”, and although there is some variation between agencies in 
nomenclature, the philosophy is identical – the highest rated bonds (generally notated “AAA”) 
should have a very low chance of default, and this chance can be expected to increase as we 
move down the rating levels through B, C and eventually down to D (default) status. The better 
rating levels are known as Investment Grade, and the lower levels are known as Non-investment 
or Speculative grade. 
There are two parts to risk of a bond. First, what is the risk that a bond will have a “credit 
event” such as default, and second, if such an event occurs, what percentage of the principal and 
accrued interest will be recovered? It is reasonable to assume that risk of default increases and 
recover rates fall as we move down through the rating level hierarchy. Highest level ratings 
indicate the best quality borrowers, with stable earnings, a strong capacity to repay loans, and 
often a history of similar successful repayments. A lower quality rating may indicate a company 
that has high debt with relatively minimal spare cash flow for contingencies, or a cyclic company 
or one with volatile earnings. A lower rating generally indicates greater risk. 
Studies have been completed both in the academic world and within the agencies that 
looked at the effect of rating upgrades and downgrades on both the particular bond issues rated 
and the issuing corporation or sovereign entity. 
Of particular interest is the effect of a rating downgrade. Such a downgrade is an 
indication that the bond may be at greater risk of loss or impairment than previously supposed. 
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From the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), if we assume that the pool of fixed income 
investors is rational, then they will demand greater reward for a higher risk bond.  
A rating upgrade, by comparison, is a weaker leading indicator. The risk of the bond may 
be less than previously expected, but investors tend to react less to a potential gain than the 
equivalent potential loss. Furthermore, in the case of an upgrade to a bond, the potential payoff 
to an investor is capped at par, while downside losses can reach 100%. 
The theory of efficient markets states that prices of securities should reflect all public 
knowledge (assuming the semi-strong theory). Rating agencies claim that their ratings are based 
only upon public knowledge. Thus if we have a secondary market for a bond, and it is 
downgraded, then we may or may not see a decrease in the market price of the bond (and a 
corresponding increase in yield). This depends on whether the rating downgrade is truly a new 
piece of news, or merely a summary of already public information. 
In recent years, agencies like Standard & Poor’s have become more transparent with their 
rating intentions, and they now publish warnings about bonds that are on “positive” or 
“negative” outlook ahead of most actual rating migrations. These warnings are known as putting 
a rating on “Credit Watch”. 
With ratings determined from public information and the distribution of credit watch 
warnings, we would thus expect that when a rating migration actually occurs, it should have 
already been priced into the bond by the market, and there should be little movement in bond 
price.  Studies have actually found that the rating migration contains new information for the 
market, and there is a definite movement in bond prices after downgrades (although little if any 
changes due to an upgrade). Thus the effect of a rating change upon price has been 
comprehensively studied. 
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One question currently unanswered is regarding the timeliness of the different rating 
agencies. Is one agency generally quicker than others at upgrading or downgrading bonds? Does 
one agency have better insight into particular industries? 
This paper investigates the timeliness of rating migrations across rating agencies. While it 
does not look at the accuracy of rating changes in terms of subsequent price changes, it does look 
at when rating migrations occurred for bonds that are rated by more than one rating agency. 
The universe for this study will be corporate bonds. Structured finance data was difficult 
to obtain, and similar studies to this have already been performed in the sovereign rating space. 
Bonds in three markets will be examined, as described in Table 1. The three markets were 
chosen as they are relatively liquid markets with more than one sizable rating agency in 
operation. Data was obtained from Bloomberg (more detail on this later in the paper). 
 
Table 1: Dataset 
Location USA USA Canada Australia 
Dataset S&P 500 All Corporates All Corporates All Corporates 
Date Range 1980 – 2005 2004-2005 1980-2005 1980-2005 
Rating Agencies Fitch 
Moody’s 
S&P 
A.M.Best 
DBRS 
Fitch 
Moody’s 
S&P 
CBRS 
DBRS 
Moody’s 
S&P 
Fitch 
Moody’s 
S&P 
 
The selected agencies have a large number of published rating migrations within the particular 
location (large means within one order of magnitude of the largest agencies in that location).  
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Diagram 1: Geographic spread of rating agencies 
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III. The Rating Agencies 
The big three US rating agencies have recently been joined by two other smaller 
NRSROs. Table 2 provides some information about each of the rating agencies.  
 
Table 2: Rating Agency Information 
Agency Size / Locations Owner Other brands Affiliations 
Standard & Poor’s 6,300 people, 20 
countries 
McGraw Hill  
(Public US Company) 
since 1966. 
CBRS (Canadian Bond 
Rating Service)  
CRISIL (India) 2005 
 
Moody’s 2,900 people, 22 
countries 
Public US Company since 
2001, previously part of 
Dun & Bradstreet 
Operates economy.com 
& Moody’s KMV 
 
Fitch Ratings Not known Subsidiary of Fimalac 
(France) since 1997 
IBCA (London) 1997 
Duffs & Phelps 2000 
Thomson BankWatch 
2000 
Clasificadora de Riesgo Humphreys 
Limitada (Chile) 
ICRA Ltd (India) 
Moody’s Interfax (Russia) 
Korea Investor Service, Inc. 
Middle East Ratings & Investor 
Services (MERIS – Egypt) 
Midroog Limited (Israel). 
Dominion Bond 
Rating Service 
(DBRS) 
 
117 Analysts listed 
on Website. 
Privately owned, founded 
1976. based in Toronto, 
now expanding into the 
US. 
  
A. M. Best Founded 1899, 
Offices in USA, UK 
and Hong Kong. 
Private Company   
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IV. Ratings Categories1  
Each of the rating agencies uses a set of different corporate credit “ratings”. While the 
wording of definitions varies across agency, they each follow a similar philosophy, with around 
26 possible rating levels (or “notches”) for a long-term credit. Additionally, the rating agencies 
sometimes offer guidance about expected future rating migrations – for example, they may 
indicate that a rating is at risk, and may be soon downgraded. 
The rating agencies offer a number of different types of ratings, including: 
• Long term ratings 
• Short term ratings 
• Outlooks 
This paper looks at long term ratings and migrations in these ratings. Short term ratings are 
labelled in a different manner and will be outside the scope of this paper. In order to discuss the 
ratings for individual rating agencies, we first need to define the ratings levels for each agency. 
 
                                                 
1 From Wikipedia and Rating Agency websites. See References for details 
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V. S&P Long Term Credit Ratings: 
S&P rates companies on a scale from AAA to D. Intermediate ratings are offered at each 
level between AA and B (i.e., BBB+, BBB and BBB-). For some companies, S&P may also 
offer guidance (termed a "credit watch") as to whether it is likely to be upgraded (positive), 
downgraded (negative) or uncertain (neutral) 
 
Table 3: S&P Ratings 
Investment Grade 
AAA the best quality companies, reliable and stable 
AA quality companies, a bit higher risk than AAA 
A economic situation can affect finance 
BBB medium class companies, which are satisfactory at the moment 
  
Non-Investment Grade 
BB more prone to changes in the economy 
B financial situation varies noticeably 
CCC 
currently vulnerable and dependent on favorable economic conditions to meet its 
commitments 
CC highly vulnerable, very speculative bonds 
C 
highly vulnerable, perhaps in bankruptcy or in arrears but still continuing to pay 
out on obligations 
CI past due on interest 
R under regulatory supervision due to its financial situation 
SD has selectively defaulted on some obligations 
D 
has defaulted on obligations and S&P believes that it will generally default on 
most or all obligations 
NR not rated 
 
Note that CBRS and DBRS use a very similar scale to S&P, although DBRS has ‘H’ and 
‘L’ in place of ‘+’ and ‘–’. 
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VI. Moody’s Long Term Obligation Ratings 
Moody's long-term obligation ratings are opinions of the relative credit risk of fixed-
income obligations with an original maturity of one or more years. They address the possibility 
that a financial obligation will not be honored as promised. Such ratings reflect both the 
likelihood of default and any financial loss suffered in the event of default. 
 
Table 4: Moody’s Ratings 
Investment Grade 
Aaa 
Obligations rated Aaa are judged to be of the highest quality, with minimal 
credit risk. 
Aa1, Aa2, Aa3 
Obligations rated Aa are judged to be of high quality and are subject to very 
low credit risk. 
A1, A2, A3 
Obligations rated A are considered upper-medium grade and are subject to 
low credit risk. 
Baa1, Baa2, Baa3 
Obligations rated Baa are subject to moderate credit risk. They are considered 
medium-grade and as such may possess certain speculative characteristics. 
  
Speculative Grade 
Ba1, Ba2, Ba3 
Obligations rated Ba are judged to have speculative elements and are subject 
to substantial credit risk. 
B1, B2, B3 
Obligations rated B are considered speculative and are subject to high credit 
risk. 
Caa1, Caa2, Caa3 
Obligations rated Caa are judged to be of poor standing and are subject to 
very high credit risk. 
Ca 
Obligations rated Ca are highly speculative and are likely in, or very near, 
default, with some prospect of recovery of principal and interest. 
C 
Obligations rated C are the lowest rated class of bonds and are typically in 
default, with little prospect for recovery of principal or interest. 
  
Special 
D In Default 
WR Withdrawn Rating 
NR Not Rated 
P Provisional 
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VII. Fitch Long-Term Credit Ratings 
Fitch's long-term credit ratings are set up along a scale almost identical to that used by 
S&P. Moody's also uses a similar scale, but names the categories differently. Like S&P, Fitch 
also uses intermediate ratings for each category between AA and B (i.e., BBB+, BBB and BBB-). 
 
Table 5: Fitch Ratings 
Investment Grade 
AAA the best quality companies, reliable and stable 
AA quality companies, a bit higher risk than AAA 
A economic situation can affect finance 
BBB medium class companies, which are satisfactory at the moment 
  
Non-Investment Grade (Also known at Junk) 
BB more prone to changes in the economy 
B financial situation varies noticeably 
CCC 
currently vulnerable and dependent on favorable economic conditions to meet its 
commitments 
CC highly vulnerable, very speculative bonds 
C 
highly vulnerable, perhaps in bankruptcy or in arrears but still continuing to pay 
out on obligations 
CI past due on interest 
R under regulatory supervision due to its financial situation 
SD has selectively defaulted on some obligations 
D 
has defaulted on obligations and S&P believes that it will generally default on 
most or all obligations 
NR not rated 
 
When comparing ratings across agencies, we will make the assumption that rating levels 
are readily comparable between the agencies. For long term credit ratings, each has the same 
number of rating levels, and when performing an analysis we will be assigning a code to each 
rating level as detailed in Appendix 4. 
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VIII. Obtaining a dataset 
Data was obtained from a Bloomberg terminal, using the RATC rating changes command. 
Bloomberg has the following rating–related commands available: 
 
Table 6: Bloomberg commands 
Command Use Notes 
RATE Credit Ratings GOVT, CORP, MTGE, M-MKT, PFD, EQUITY 
RATC Rating Changes Historical rating changes for a given market and date range. 
RCHG Rating History CMO – Collaterized Mortgage Obligations only 
RATD Rating Definition Rating categories for a particular rating agency. 
CSDR Sovereign Debt Ratings  
 
The RATC command provided useful data for corporate ratings. It lists rating migrations 
across a specified date range for a given country and agency. It can be further specified by a 
subset of all securities (such as SPX for members of the S&P 500 in the following result set): 
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Diagram 2: Screen Capture from Bloomberg RATC Command 
COMPANY CREDIT RATING REVISIONS    RATC 
Select Security List: Index: SPX Date: 1/ 1/2005 - 11/26/2005   
Search Criteria: Rating Type: ALL ; Agency: S&P ; Grade: ALL Direction: ALL  
Country: US;       
Industry Type: All       
Company 
Name Date Rating Type Agency
Current 
Rating 
Last 
Rating Country 
Industry 
Type 
Progress 
Energy Inc  11/23/2005 Outlook S&P  STABLE  US 
Electric-
Integrated 
Progress 
Energy Inc  11/23/2005 
ST Local Issuer 
Credit S&P  A-2  A-3  US 
Electric-
Integrated 
Progress 
Energy Inc  11/23/2005 
ST Foreign 
Issuer Credit S&P  A-2  A-3  US 
Electric-
Integrated 
Calpine Corp  11/22/2005 
LT Local Issuer 
Credit S&P  B- *- B-  US 
Independ 
Power 
Producer  
Calpine Corp  11/22/2005 
LT Foreign 
Issuer Credit S&P  B- *- B-  US 
Independ 
Power 
Producer  
 
In this table, we can see that Progress Energy has an outlook, and upgrades for Short 
Term local issuer credit and foreign issuer credit. Calpine has changed from B- to B- with a 
negative credit watch for both Long Term local issuer credit and foreign issuer credit.  
Four different datasets were analysed: 
• All USA Corporations for the period 1 January 2004 to 26 November 2005 
• USA Corporations belonging to the S&P 500 from 1980 to 26 November 2005,  
• All Australian corporations from 1980 to 26 November 2005 
• All Canadian corporations from 1980 to 26 November 2005. 
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Bloomberg data was very sparse before 1 January 1980, so this determined a natural start 
date for the datasets. The data collection date was 26 November 2005, and all datasets are current 
up until that date. 
Getting data for all US corporate bonds would result in a huge dataset that would be hard 
to manipulate. For example, the year 2004 returned 16,243 records, so it was impractical to use 
an exhaustive list of ratings for the US market. Instead, the US data is analysed in two ways: 
• first with a deep slice – all S&P members from 1980 to 26 November 2005 
• second, with a wide slice – all USA corporate bonds for 2004/2005 up until 26 November 
2005. 
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Table 7: Raw Data Available 
Data Set Date 
Range 
Total 
Set Size 
Set Size by Agency 
    (Large)         (Small) 
Set Size 
by Rating Type 
USA S&P 500 01/01/1980 
to 
26/11/2005 
17,909 Fitch 2,686 
Moodys 7,292 
S&P 7,365 
 
AMBest 69 
CBRS 45 
CRISIL 2 
DBRS 441 
R&I 9 
Changes 12,861 
New Ratings 3,878 
Negative Outlook 153 
Positive Outlook 112 
Stable Outlook 905 
USA All Ratings 01/01/2004 
to 
26/11/2005 
35,828 AMBest 3,757 
DBRS 1,016 
Fitch 5,098 
Moody’s 13,636 
S&P 12,246 
Care 1 
CRISIL 1 
JCR 22 
KR 7 
Mikuni 3 
NICE 2 
R&I 37 
RAM 2 
Changes 21,508 
New Ratings 5,538 
Negative Outlook 1,270 
Positive Outlook 777 
Stable Outlook 6,673 
Developing Outlook 62 
Australia All Ratings 01/01/1980 
to 
26/11/2005 
6,128 Fitch 364 
Moody’s 1,921 
S&P 3,732 
AMBest 7 
CBRS 2 
DBRS 41 
JCR 23 
MARC 1 
PEFIN 1 
R&I 36 
Changes 4,032 
New Rating 1,721 
Developing Outlook 1 
Negative Outlook 26 
Positive Outlook 22 
Stable Outlook 325 
Canada All Ratings 01/01/1980 
to 
26/11/2005 
14,005 CBRS 3,248 
DBRS 2,844 
Moody’s 3,404 
S&P 3,968 
AMBest 75 
CRISIL 1 
Fitch 433 
JCR 12 
R&I 20 
Changes 8,954 
New Rating 4.069 
Negative Outlook 124 
Positive Outlook 50 
Stable Outlook 808 
 
The total set size is the total number of ratings found for the particular dataset. This 
includes rating migrations (upgrades and downgrades), changes to credit watch, credit outlooks, 
rating initiations and termination of rating coverage. Furthermore, from table 7, it can be seen 
that the rating agencies that have substantial numbers of rating changes are a subset of all 
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agencies operating in each particular location. Table 8 lists the agencies that have sufficient data 
to allow comparisons of a large number of rating changes. The potential size of the dataset for 
each agency is also given. 
 
Table 8: Chosen Data 
Data Set Date Range Set Size 
(These Agencies only) 
By Agency By Rating Type 
USA S&P 500 01/01/1980  
to 
 26/11/2005 
17,909 Fitch 2,686 
Moodys 7,292 
S&P 7,365 
Changes 12,861 
 
USA All 
Ratings 
01/01/2004  
to 
 26/11/2005 
35,828 AMBest 3,757 
DBRS 1,016 
Fitch 5,098 
Moody’s 13,636 
S&P 12,246 
Changes 21,508 
 
 
Australia All 
Ratings 
01/01/1980  
to  
26/11/2005 
6,128 Fitch 364 
Moody’s 1,921 
S&P 3,732 
Changes 4,032 
 
 
Canada All 
Ratings 
01/01/1980  
to 
26/11/2005 
14,005 CBRS 3,248 
DBRS 2,844 
Moody’s 3,404 
S&P 3,968 
Changes 8,954 
 
 
 
 
IX. Analysis 
The data is naturally broken into the 4 different datasets. Each of these datasets was 
analysed in the same manner that will described below. Data was initially obtained from a 
Bloomberg terminal. 
The analysis was performed using a java application custom written for this paper. The 
structure of the application is shown in Diagram 3. 
The following steps were followed during the analysis: 
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• Obtain rating data from Bloomberg. 
• Obtain data about rating levels and other inputs. 
• Read all data into application 
• Convert dates to days after start of period so dates are now an easily compared 
number. 
• Sort into groups of ratings by individual company 
• Analyse each particular company’s ratings – comparing rating changes. This is the 
crucial step, and will be described in greater detail below. 
• Aggregate results by company 
• Aggregate results by industry. 
• Aggregate results by dataset. 
 
Diagram 3: Software Structure 
Agency Data
Rating Data
Company Data
Main.java
Instantiate & Call RatingChanges
RatingChanges.java
Initialize Data            Call Parser                          Call Analyser                                     Call Outputer
Parser.java
Read data from input excel files.
Decode rating types, migrations,
Agency etc.
Store in a list of Rating Data
Analyser.java
Analyse data.
Get counts – by agency, by
Rating type, by migration type.
Analyse all ratings for individual companies
Store in Company Data.
Aggregate information by Agency / by Industry
Outputer.java
Write back processed info
Back into Excel format.
Rating Constants
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Before analysis can begin, rating data needs to have rating levels, rating types and 
industries translated into numerical codes in order to compare between markets and between 
Rating Agencies. The translation data that was used is provided in Table 6 (rating level 
equivalencies) and Appendices 1 & 2 (rating types & industry assignments). 
Once data was loaded into the application and stored by company, the next step was to 
assess which rating changes can be meaningfully compared. 
The sample selection process involves only looking at ratings that occur in a period of 
time with joint ratings coverage. Thus we need at least two rating agencies to be covering the 
stock at the time of the rating action. 
Rating actions that are either upgrades or downgrades were considered. The simplest 
example is a change in rating level (for example, from AAA to AA), but for the purpose of this 
paper, the addition or removal of a credit watch was also included (so we might see a rating of 
“AAA” move to “AAA *-” which is a introduction of a negative credit watch). A change in 
credit watch provides real information to the market, and it was felt that discarding credit watch 
information would unnecessarily shrink the dataset. 
This paper will not assess initiation of ratings by an agency since this is more likely to be 
a function of the size of the analyst pool in the rating agency rather than a function of the 
agency’s effectiveness in producing timely ratings. This paper will also not assess rating 
withdrawals by agencies. 
The initial pass will look at all rating transitions. Later passes will further divide the 
dataset into investment grade (BBB/Baa and above) and speculative grade (BB/Ba and below) 
ratings, considering ratings migrations within these different data sets, and rating migrations that 
cause a company to transition from one of these subsets to the other. A rating downgrade that 
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cross the investment/speculative grade boundary are associated with larger reactions than 
downgrades in general, so this particular case will also be examined. 
We also need to define a time window within which ratings can be said to be 
“concurrent”. If S&P did an upgrade on 1 January 2004, Moody’s upgraded on 1 March 2004, 
and Fitch upgraded on 1 November 2004, can it be stated that all 3 events are related? 
Previous research in the sovereign area2 used a 20 day time period. Thus they would only 
describe two rating actions as related if they occurred within 20 days of each other. 
We feel this constraint is too restrictive. This paper is not an event study and does not 
look at price effects of ratings. Rather, it is only looking at the relative timeliness of ratings. We 
feel that ratings that are up to 92 days (approximately 3 months) may still be related to each other, 
and will use a window of this length. The decision to use a 3 month window is somewhat 
arbitrary, but we feel that rating changes that occur further apart than this are probably not 
responses to the same corporate news. A second pass using a 31 day window will be performed 
as well. 
The next issue concerns a comparison between two rating events. Are we going to only 
compare upgrades with upgrades? What happens if S&P upgrades twice, and then Moody’s later 
does one upgrade? Furthermore, what should we do if the rating change is not the same (i.e. S&P 
moves from rating level 26 to 24, and Moody’s moves from 25 to 20)? 
In order to resolve this issue, the rating changes will be assessed in a more simplistic 
manner by comparing rating changes in the same direction. Initially, we will not worry about the 
size of the transition or the start and end rating levels – but instead only the direction. If there are 
multiple rating events by one agency, we will consider the rating event closest to a rating event 
                                                 
2 Emawtee Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2004) Rating timing differences between the two leading agencies: Standard 
and Poor’s and Moody’s 
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by another agency – an example of this is if S&P downgraded twice, then Fitch downgrades, the 
second S&P rating event will be compared with the Fitch event, and if S&P downgraded once 
followed by two Fitch downgrades, then the S&P downgrade will be compared with the first 
Fitch downgrade. 
Another issue is choosing which rating types should be used. There are 54 different types 
of rating within our 4 datasets (listed in Appendix 5). However, only long term ratings are being 
considered in this paper, and also require rating types with large amounts of information. Note 
that some rating types are only used by one rating agency, but are equivalent to other rating types 
for other agencies. For example, the following rating types are used by the different rating 
agencies for equivalent credit ratings: 
 
Table 9: Rating Type equivalence examples 
S&P Moody’s Fitch 
Financial Strength Bank Financial Strength Financial Strength 
LT Foreign Issuer Credit 
LT Local Issuer Credit 
Senior Unsecured Debt Senior Unsecured Debt 
 
We will compare rating transitions across the agencies and rating types. We will also 
consider credit watch changes in cases in which the rating itself did not change. Rating types that 
are utilized are listed in Appendix 5. 
Rating migration types are defined based on the present and previous rating. There may 
or may not be a value for current rating and old rating. Both need to be defined for this rating 
entry to be a rating migration. If only one is present and the other is blank, then there is a rating 
initiation or withdrawal. 
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Table 10: Rating Migration Types – obtained from current rating versus previous rating 
Previous Rating Current Rating Migration Type 
Undefined Defined Rating Initiation 
Defined Undefined Rating Withdrawal 
In AAA to D In AAA to D    above Old Rating Upgrade 
In AAA to D In AAA to D    below Old Rating Downgrade 
In AAA to D Same as Old Rating No Change 
 
The logical flow for comparison of ratings:  
Sort all rating entries for a given company by date.  
Loop through the ratings to look at each individually. 
For a given rating, it is a rating change if it is one of the following: 
• An upgrade 
• A downgrade 
• No rating change, but with a creditwatch change upwards or downwards (For 
example, a rating change from “AAA *+” to “AAA” is a “downgrade” from 
creditwatch positive to no credit watch). 
Each rating migration is provided by one particular rating agency. For each rating 
migration, the most recent rating from each other rating agency needs to be compared, if it exists. 
If the two ratings have changed in the same direction, and are close enough in time 
(which is defined in this study as being within 92 days for the first pass of analysis, and within 
31 days for a second pass), then we will consider them related, and record this relationship. Such 
a pair of ratings indicates that one of the agencies has “lagged’ the other agency in performing 
this rating change. 
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As we iterate across all ratings for a company, we will keep track of the most recent 
rating from each agency. When looking at a valid rating change, it will be compared with each of 
the most recent ratings from other agencies if they exist. This rating will then be stored as the 
most recent rating for its particular agency. 
The lead/lag between agencies is aggregated for each company, and then aggregated for 
each industry and for each dataset. 
This study will assess the mean and median of the lead and lags, the raw number of each, 
and present histograms to illustrate whether particular agencies seem to consistently lead or lag 
compared to other agencies with their rating changes in a particular industry or data set. 
 
X. Results 
From Table 8, we have 4 datasets, namely  
• USA S&P500 Members from 1980 to 2005, 
• USA All Corporates from Jan 2005 to November 2005 
• Canada All Corporates from 1980 to 2005 
• Australia All Corporates from 1980 to 2005. 
We will perform the same analysis on each dataset. 
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XI. Australia: All Corporates from 1 January 1980 to 26 November 2005 
 The complete analysis for the Australian data is included in the body of this paper; 
similar analysis for the other 3 datasets is included in Appendices 1-3. 
Table 11: Initial Data for Australia: 
 Fitch Moody’s S&P Other Agencies Total 
# Companies Covered 75 276 308 - -
Total Ratings Records 364 1921 3732 0 6017
Other/Not useful3 148 533 1409 - 2090
Useful 216 1388 2323 - 3927
Initiations 89 371 609 - 1069
Upgrades 29 230 316 - 575
Downgrades 49 358 535 - 942
Withdrawals 6 97 220 - 323
No Change 43 332 643 - 1018
Creditwatch upgrade4 14 156 220 - 390
Creditwatch unchanged 10 22 47 - 79
Creditwatch downgrade 19 154 376 - 549
 
The count of companies is all companies that have at least one rating entry by the Rating 
Agency. If only the potentially Useful Rating Data are considered from the table above, we have 
the following information.  
 
Table 12: Comparable Data for Australia. 
 Fitch Moody’s S&P Total 
Upgrades 29 230 316 1344
Downgrades 49 358 535 2279
Creditwatch upgrade 14 156 220 705
Creditwatch downgrade 19 154 376 305
                                                 
3 Other/Not useful includes “outlooks” or short term ratings. This study is only looking at long term ratings. 
4 Creditwatch upgrades and creditwatch downgrades involve a change of creditwatch level without any rating notch 
change (for example, from AA to AA *-). The “No Change” category is a sum of the creditwatch categories. 
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Upgrades and Creditwatch upgrades are both considered upward movements in a rating 
by an agency, and Downgrades and Creditwatch downgrades are both considered downward 
movements in a rating by an agency. When ratings are compared, upward movements will be 
compared with upward movements only, and downward movements with downward movements. 
 
Figure 1:  The size of rating transitions in Australia: 
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The largest grouping is a zero notch rating migration – which may still be useful data as 
we can have a credit watch change. The next most common events are a one notch downgrade 
and a one notch upgrade. Note that the range of possible rating upgrades and downgrades is from 
-26 (a rating change from AAA to D) to +26 (D to AAA). Extreme rating migrations like this are 
unlikely, and indeed our distribution shows that by far the most common events involve a 1 or 
two notch migration.  
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If we then look at only the ratings that involve an upgrade or downgrade, we get the 
following set of data: 
 
Table 13: Number of Ratings Transitions in Australia by Type: 
 Fitch Moody’s S&P TOTAL 
I / Upgrade 29 211 286 526
I / Downgrade 43 295 430 768
I / CW upgrade 14 121 170 305
I / CW downgrade 19 125 332 476
  
S / Upgrade 0 12 13 25
S / Downgrade 4 44 65 113
S / CW upgrade 0 35 50 85
S / CW downgrade 0 29 44 73
  
I Æ S Downgrade 2 19 40 61
S Æ I Upgrade 0 7 17 24
 
I = Investment Grade (BBB or better) CW Upgrade = credit watch was increased 
S = Speculative Grade CW Downgrade = credit watch was decreased. 
 
Rating migrations by different agencies were compared using a 92 day window and a 31 
day window. The window determines the maximum number of days that can separate two 
different rating migrations that are still considered related. Thus the 92 day window implies that 
a Fitch rating upgrade 3 months after an S&P rating upgrade are related and should be compared. 
The 31 day window implies that only rating migrations by different agencies that occurred within 
1 month should be compared. The 92 day window may be more comprehensive, allowing 
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comparison of a greater number of rating changes, but it also has the potential risk that rating 
changes close to three months apart would heavily influence the mean lead or lag.  
In table 14, we also note that a negative value for the Mean / Median means that the 
Rating Agency on the left is leading the Rating Agency at the top. A positive value means that 
the Agency at the left is lagging the Rating Agency at the top 
 
Table 14: Number of Leading / Lagging rating migrations versus other rating Agencies in Australia:  
Moody’s S & P  
Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade 
 Fitch 92 day 31 day 92 day 31 day 92 day 31 day 92 day 31 day 
#Leading 
#Same 
#Lagging 
Mean 
Median 
 6 
0 
3 
-11 
-28 
4
0
1
-22
-14
5
5
11
8
1
3
5
5
0
0 
11
0
5
-31
-6
5 
0 
4 
-5 
-14 
7 
2 
13 
18 
5 
5
2
5
-2
0
 Moody’s         
#Leading 
#Same 
#Lagging 
Mean 
Median 
     24
7
21
-2
0
6 
7 
12 
9 
0 
58 
15 
69 
6 
0 
32
15
26
-1
0
  
 The rating agency at left are compared with the rating agency at the top. For the first 
intersection: Fitch vs Moody’s, the values are leading=6, same=0, lagging=3, mean=-11, 
median=-28 for the 92 day window. 
This means that Fitch leads Moody’s in 6 ratings, and lags Moody’s in 3 ratings. The 
mean time between related ratings from Fitch and Moody’s is -11 days, and the median time 
between ratings for Fitch and Moody’s is -28 days. It can be stated that Fitch leads Moody’s for 
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timeliness of ratings in Australia, both from the number of leading versus lagging rating changes, 
and also from the mean and median difference between ratings from these agencies. 
The table is a matrix, and it can be transposed. Thus, from this table it can also be seen 
that Moody’s lags Fitch by a median of -28 days using 92 day data. 
This comparative timing information was aggregated into an indicator of how many other 
Agencies each particular Agency leads or lags. The number of leading ratings versus number of 
lagging ratings is one indicator. The mean is useful as well. The Median is related to number of 
leading and lagging ratings (for example, if there are more leading ratings, then the median 
should be a leading number). Then scoring 1 point for a clear lead, 0.5 points for a mixed 
message between count of rating changes and mean, and 0 for a clear lag, we get the following 
table: 
 
Table 15: Summary of Leading versus Lagging in Australia  
Agency Upgrade Lead/Lag Downgrade Lead / Lag 
Fitch 2 / 0 0 / 2 
Moody’s 0.5 / 1.5 1.5 / 0.5 
S&P 0.5 / 1.5 1.5 / 0.5 
Timeliness Order: Fitch Moody's S&P S&P Moody's Fitch 
 
This suggests S&P and Moody’s appears the timeliest in Australia for downgrades, but 
the least timely for upgrades. This implies that S&P and Moody’s are more conservative or 
cautious in their ratings than is Fitch in Australia. 
One other dimension was analysed – the timeliness of Rating Agencies on an industry by 
industry basis. Table 16 details an industry breakout of rating comparisons. The industry groups 
are defined in Appendix 6. 
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Table 16: Summary of Leading and Lagging Rating Agencies for Upgrades and Downgrades by Industry 
in Australia 
 
 The breakout by Industry confirms the results of the summary in table 15. Within the 
Australian market, S&P and Moody’s appear faster in downgrades in most industries, and Fitch 
is faster to upgrade ratings in many industries. This table also allows an analysis of where most 
of the ratings changes have occurred. For Australia, most of the action has been in the Finance 
industry, with lower but substantial changes in the Utility, Commodity and Government areas. 
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XII. Conclusions 
The following table is a summary of results across the different datasets: 
 
Table 17: Summary of Agency Timeliness 
 Australia Canada USA S&P500 USA Broad 
Order of timeliness 
for upgrades 
<faster> 
to 
<slower> 
Fitch 
Moody’s 
S&P 
S&P 
Fitch 
DBRS 
Moody’s 
CBRS 
Fitch 
S&P 
Moody’s 
Fitch 
S&P 
Moody’s 
DBRS 
Order of timeliness 
for downgrades 
<faster> 
to  
<slower> 
S&P 
Moody’s 
Fitch 
DBRS 
Fitch 
CBRS 
Moody’s 
S&P 
S&P 
Fitch 
Moody’s 
S&P 
Fitch 
DBRS 
Moody’s 
 
Timeliness of ratings can be interpreted in both a positive and a negative way. A rating 
agency that is faster to change ratings may be doing so from an operational or a philosophical 
point of view. They may have extra resources and the ability to complete risk assessment before 
their competitors. They may also have a different assessment of risk, and decide that the correct 
rating level has changed prior to competitors. 
Corporate credit ratings attempt to be an accurate forecast of future risk for a bond. If a 
rating agency repeatedly upgrades and downgrades a particular bond, then market participants 
will have less confidence in the performance of that bond and the ability of the Rating Agency to 
accurately forecast risk. Many corporations operate within a multi-year industry cycle, and rating 
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agencies also must take these larger cycles into account when providing a rating, and try to avoid 
rating changes simply to match the cycle of an industry. 
This paper has found that Standard and Poor’s tends to be the most cautious of the Rating 
Agencies, with the fastest downgrades of corporate bonds, and average timing for upgrades. The 
one notable exception to this rule is in the Canadian Market when Standard and Poor’s appears to 
be more accepting of risk and slower to downgrade. Across the 4 datasets Moody’s is the slowest 
to downgrade bonds, but is also slow to upgrade as well. Fitch is generally quite aggressive with 
both upgrades and downgrades. 
This paper has found that rating agencies are not consistent in their relative timeliness in 
different markets. While each rating agency has guidelines and Ratings Criteria to help 
standardize rating quality and consistency, it is apparent that this infrastructure does not ensure 
the same relative performance in different markets. The differences can most likely be attributed 
to differing staff knowledge and expertise in the various locations, poor internal dialog between 
the regional offices of a Rating Agency, and also variation due to different legal environments. 
While this paper’s results can be explained by Rating Agency philosophy and operational 
ability, these results can also be used in a predictive way. Due to the expected relative timing of 
rating changes, an S&P downgrade is more likely than other rating changes to result in a 
subsequent downgrade by a second rating agency. Also, a rating upgrade by Fitch is most likely 
to be followed by an upgrade by another Rating Agency. Moody’s rating changes have less of a 
predictive effect, as they more commonly occur after other agencies have already moved their 
rating. It is outside the scope of this paper to examine the correlation between rating migrations 
by different agencies, but quantifying the increase in the likelihood of a rating change by one 
agency when another agency has announced a rating change is a worthy extension to this paper. 
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Appendix 1: Analysis of Canadian Data: 
All Corporates from 1 January 1980 to 26 November 2005 
 There are 5 Rating Agencies operating in Canada that have published a sufficient 
quantity of rating changes for analysis in this paper.  
 
Table 18: Initial Data for Canada 
 CBRS DBRS Fitch Moody’s S&P Other Agencies Total 
# Companies Covered 475 600 74 453 466 - -
Total Ratings Records 3248 2844 324 3968 3184 437 14005
Other/Not useful 1382 1439 0 1085 0 - 4343
Useful 1866 1405 324 2883 3184 - 9662
Initiations 438 572 112 836 898 - 2856
Upgrades 410 109 37 429 359 - 1344
Downgrades 433 261 76 684 825 - 2279
Withdrawals 474 143 13 337 245 - 1212
No Change 111 320 86 597 857 - 1971
Creditwatch upgrade 21 75 38 243 328 - 705
Creditwatch unchanged 73 119 8 31 74 - 961
Creditwatch downgrade 17 126 40 323 455 - 305
 
 This rough data set provides the following set of rating changes that can be compared 
with those from other rating agencies: 
 
Table 19: Comparable data for Canada 
 CBRS DBRS Fitch Moody’s S&P Total 
Upgrades 410 109 37 429 359 1344
Downgrades 433 261 76 684 825 2279
Creditwatch upgrade 21 75 38 243 328 705
Creditwatch downgrade 17 126 40 323 455 305
 
A summary of all rating transitions looks as follows: 
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Figure 2:  The size of rating transitions in Canada: 
Rating Transitions - Canada 1980-2005
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The largest grouping is a zero rating notch migration. One notch downgrades and 
upgrades are the next most common events. 
Table 20: Number of Ratings Transitions by Type in Canada: 
 CBRS DBRS Fitch Moody’s S&P Total 
I / Upgrade 313 90 34 222 182 841
I / Downgrade 330 159 64 295 393 1241
I / CW upgrade 13 61 34 132 182 421
I / CW downgrade 11 98 37 186 317 652
   
S / Upgrade 55 17 1 166 139 378
S / Downgrade 55 73 7 326 352 813
S / CW upgrade 9 14 4 111 146 284
S / CW downgrade 3 28 3 137 138 309
   
I Æ S Downgrade 48 29 5 63 80 225
S Æ I Upgrade 42 2 2 41 38 125
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A summary of the number of ratings that lead or lag those from other companies is listed 
in table 21. Note that this was done for both a 92 day and a 31 day “window”. 
 
Table 21: Lead or Lag versus other rating Agencies in Canada: 
DBRS Fitch Moody’s S & P  
Upgrade Down Upgrade Down Upgrade Down Upgrade Down 
 CBRS 92d 31d 92d 31d 92d 31d 92d 31d 92d 31d 92d 31d 92d 31d 92d 31d 
#Leading 
#Same 
#Lagging 
Mean 
Median 
 1 
0 
2 
16 
16 
0 
0 
1 
16 
16 
9 
0 
9 
0 
1 
6 
0 
7 
2 
4 
0 
0 
3 
43 
43 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
67 
74 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
14 
2 
13 
-11 
0 
1 
2 
9 
10 
15 
31 
5 
23 
2 
-7 
16 
5 
8 
-3 
-7 
6 
1 
6 
-11 
0 
2 
1 
3 
0 
0 
30 
2 
15 
-17 
-19 
15 
2 
10 
-5 
-13 
 DBRS                 
#Leading 
#Same 
#Lagging 
Mean 
Median 
     4 
3 
5 
2 
0 
4 
3 
3 
-5 
0 
11 
6 
15 
4 
0 
6 
6 
9 
3 
0 
26 
0 
13 
-20 
-26 
13 
0 
6 
-6 
-1 
81 
15 
54 
-1 
-1 
53 
15 
25 
-4 
-2 
6 
2 
13 
16 
10 
4 
2 
7 
1 
0 
 90 
34 
58 
-2 
0 
54 
34 
23 
-2 
0 
 Fitch                 
#Leading 
#Same 
#Lagging 
Mean 
Median 
         5 
1 
2 
-4 
-14 
2 
1 
0 
-10 
-3 
15 
1 
23 
11 
3 
13 
1 
12 
-1 
0 
2 
3 
5 
8 
0 
0 
3 
3 
9 
0 
18 
1 
16 
-3 
-1 
10 
1 
12 
0 
0 
 Moody’s                 
#Leading 
#Same 
#Lagging 
Mean 
Median 
             37 
3 
53 
0 
2 
15 
6 
31 
4 
1 
132 
58 
151 
0 
0 
74 
56 
86 
1 
0 
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Looking at aggregating timing for each agency’s for upgrades (lead/lag versus other 
agencies for average of median and mean): 
 
Table 22: Summary of leading versus lagging in Canada 
Agency Upgrade Lead/Lag Downgrade Lead/Lag 
CBRS 1/3 2/2 
DBRS 2.5/1.5 3/1 
Fitch 2.5/1.5 2.5/1.1 
Moody’s 1/3 1.5/2.5 
S&P 3.5/0.5 0.5/3.5 
Timeliness Order: S&P Fitch DBRS Moody's CBRS DBRS Fitch CBRS Moody’s S&P 
 
Table 23: Summary of Leading and Lagging Rating Agencies for Upgrades and Downgrades by industry 
in Canada: 
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Appendix 2: Analysis of USA Data 
S&P 500 Constituents from 1 January 1980 to 26 November 2005 
 
Table 24: Initial Data for US S&P 
 Fitch Moody’s S&P Other Agencies Total 
# Companies Covered 320 434 444 - -
Total Ratings Records 2686 7292 7365 566 17909
Other/Not useful  - 
Useful 1887 5973 4926 - 13038
Initiations 647 1369 789 139 2944
Upgrades 281 1082 1080 10 2453
Downgrades 528 1457 1428 35 3448
Withdrawals 78 429 94 15 616
No Change 353 1636 1535 53 3577
Creditwatch upgrade 136 658 526 6 1326
Creditwatch unchanged 20 23 34 15 92
Creditwatch downgrade 197 955 975 32 2159
 
Table 25: Comparable Data for US S&P: 
 Fitch Moody’s S&P Total 
Upgrades 281 1082 1080 2443
Downgrades 528 1457 1428 3413
Creditwatch upgrade 136 658 526 1320
Creditwatch downgrade 197 955 975 2127
 
A summary of all rating transitions looks as follows: 
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Figure 3:  The size of rating transitions for USA S&P: 
Rating Transitions - USA - S&P 500 Members, 1980-2005
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The largest grouping is for a one rating notch downgrade. A zero notch migration and a 
one notch upgrade are the next most common events. 
Table 26: Number of Ratings Transitions by Type for US S&P: 
 Fitch Moody’s S&P Total 
I / Upgrade 175 598 721 1502
I / Downgrade 350 981 1110 2469
I / CW upgrade 79 380 377 839
I / CW downgrade 165 713 847 1752
  
S / Upgrade 66 338 207 613
S / Downgrade 116 275 174 568
S / CW upgrade 57 278 149 487
S / CW downgrade 32 242 128 407
  
I Æ S Downgrade 62 201 144 411
S Æ I Upgrade 40 146 152 338
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A summary of the number of ratings that lead or lag those from other companies is listed 
in table 27. Note that this was done for both a 92 day and a 31 day “window”. 
 
Table 27: Lead or Lag versus other rating Agencies for US S&P: 
Moody’s S & P  
Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade 
 Fitch 92 day 31 day 92 day 31 day 92 day 31 day 92 day 31 day 
#Leading 
#Same 
#Lagging 
Mean 
Median 
 63 
4 
54 
-5 
-1 
36 
2 
26 
-4 
-1 
256 
56 
216 
-1 
0 
145 
53 
119 
-1 
0 
42 
14 
32 
-3 
0 
20 
14 
20 
0 
0 
198 
85 
216 
0 
0 
113 
81 
135 
0 
0 
 Moody’s         
#Leading 
#Same 
#Lagging 
Mean 
Median 
     146 
14 
168 
5 
2 
91 
14 
93 
0 
0 
443 
130 
538 
0 
0 
247 
136 
352 
1 
0 
 
Looking at aggregating timing for each agency’s for upgrades (lead/lag versus other 
agencies for average of median and mean): 
 
Table 28: Summary of Leading versus Lagging Upgrades for US S&P 
Agency Upgrade Lead/Lag Downgrade Lead / Lag 
Fitch 2/0 1/1 
Moody’s 0/2 0/2 
S&P 1/1 2/0 
Timeliness Order: Fitch S&P Moody's S&P Fitch Moody's 
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Table 29: Summary of Upgrades and downgrades and the order of Rating Agency timeliness by industry 
for US S&P 
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Appendix 3: Analysis of USA Data: 
All Corporates from 1 January 2005 to 26 November 2005 
Table 30: Initial Data for US All Corporates 
 DBRS Fitch Moody’s S&P Other Agencies Total 
# Companies Covered 321 2100 3663 3515 - -
Total Ratings Records 1016 5098 13636 12246 3832 35828
Other/Not useful 504 2092 3311 3809 - 13548
Useful 512 3006 10325 8437 - 22280
Initiations 353 545 1674 1043 - 3615
Upgrades 20 634 1646 1219 - 3519
Downgrades 36 550 1790 1854 - 4230
Withdrawals 6 289 2104 820 - 3219
No Change 97 988 3111 3501 - 7697
Creditwatch upgrade 12 490 1654 1526 - 3682
Creditwatch unchanged 41 38 85 194 - 358
Creditwatch downgrade 44 460 1372 1781 - 3657
 
Table 31: Comparable data for US All Corporates 
 DBRS Fitch Moody’s S&P Total 
Upgrades 20 634 1646 1043 3343 
Downgrades 36 550 1790 1854 4230 
Creditwatch upgrade 12 490 1654 1526 3682 
Creditwatch  downgrade 44 460 1372 1781 3657 
 
A summary of all rating transitions looks as follows: 
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Figure 4:  The size of rating transitions in US for all Corporates: 
Rating Transitions - USA - Broad Market, 2004-2005
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The largest grouping is a one notch downgrade. A one notch upgrade is the next most 
common transition. 
Table 32: Number of Ratings Transitions by Type for All US Corporates: 
 DBRS Fitch Moody’s S&P Total 
I / Upgrade 12 328 455 446 1241 
I / Downgrade 26 328 387 582 1323 
I / CW upgrade 6 295 604 673 1578 
I / CW downgrade 37 349 623 1022 2031 
   
S / Upgrade 6 224 1036 645 1911 
S / Downgrade 6 172 1277 1145 2600 
S / CW upgrade 6 195 1050 853 2104 
S / CW downgrade 7 111 749 759 1626 
   
I Æ S Downgrade 4 50 126 128 307 
S Æ I Upgrade 2 82 155 128 367 
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A summary of the number of ratings that lead or lag those from other companies is listed 
in table 33. Note that this was done for both a 92 day and a 31 day “window”. 
 
Table 33: Lead or Lag versus other rating Agencies for All US Corporates: 
  Fitch Moody’s S & P 
  Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade 
 DBRS 92d 31d 92d 31d 92d 31d 92d 31d 92d 31d 92d 31d 
#Leading 
#Same 
#Lagging 
Mean 
Median 
 6 
0 
9 
-2 
1 
6 
0 
9 
-2 
1 
13 
5 
18 
8 
9 
8 
5 
12 
-1 
0 
0 
0 
8 
8 
9 
0 
0 
8 
8 
9 
39 
6 
21 
-5 
-7 
35 
6 
13 
-8 
-15 
12 
2 
21 
10 
-5 
8 
2 
2 
-4 
-5 
12 
2 
21 
11 
11 
8 
2 
12 
0 
4 
 Fitch             
#Leading 
#Same 
#Lagging 
Mean 
Median 
     144 
21 
140 
-1 
0 
100 
21 
82 
-1 
0 
169 
61 
173 
0 
0 
100 
61 
84 
-1 
0 
82 
38 
57 
-3 
0 
60 
38 
42 
-2 
0 
143 
73 
167 
-1 
0 
77 
70 
107 
0 
0 
 Moody’s             
#Leading 
#Same 
#Lagging 
Mean 
Median 
         211 
51 
274 
1 
1 
127 
51 
182 
1 
1 
445 
160 
603 
0 
0 
229 
148 
391 
1 
1 
 
Looking at aggregating timing for each agency’s for upgrades (lead/lag versus other 
agencies for average of median and mean): 
 
Table 34: Summary of Leading versus Lagging Upgrades for All US Corporates 
Agency Upgrade Lead/Lag Downgrade Lead / Lag 
DBRS 0.5 / 2.5 1 / 2 
Fitch 3 / 0 1.5 / 1.5 
Moody’s 1 / 2 0.5 / 2.5 
S&P 1.5 / 1.5 3 / 0 
Timeliness Order: Fitch S&P Moody's DBRS S&P Fitch DBRS Moody's 
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Table 35: Summary of Upgrades and downgrades and the order of Rating Agency timeliness by industry 
for all US Corporates 
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Appendix 4: Rating Equivalences 
The different rating agencies each have their own series of credit rating levels. However, 
for long term corporate bond ratings, each uses a similar scale with 26 steps. In this study, we 
will use the following translation between ratings by different agencies: 
Table 36: Rating Equivalences 
Code CBRS DBRS Fitch Moody's S&P 
26 AAA AAA AAA Aaa AAA 
25 AA+ AAH AA+ Aa1 AA+ 
24 AA AA AA Aa2 AA 
23 AA- AAL AA- Aa3 AA- 
22 A+ AH A+ A1 A+ 
21 A A A A2 A 
20 A- AL A- A3 A- 
19 BBB+ BBBH BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 
18 BBB BBB BBB Baa2 BBB 
17 BBB- BBBL BBB- Baa3 BBB- 
16 BB+ BBH BB+ Ba1 BB+ 
15 BB BB BB Ba2 BB 
14 BB- BBL BB- Ba3 BB- 
13 B+ BH B+ B1 B+ 
12 B B B B2 B 
11 B- BL B- B3 B- 
10 CCC+ CCCH CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ 
9 CCC CCC CCC Caa2 CCC 
8 CCC- CCCL CCC- Caa3 CCC- 
7 CC+ CCH CC+ Ca CC+ 
6 CC CC CC Ca CC 
5 CC- CCL CC- Ca CC- 
4 C+ CH C+ C C+ 
3 C C C C C 
2 C- CL C- C C- 
1 D D D D D 
0 NR NR NR NR NR 
0 WR WR WR WR WR 
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Appendix 5: Rating Types 
The data from Bloomberg included a number of different types of rating. For this 
particular study, we chose to only look at long term credit ratings. We also required meaningful 
amounts of data – at least two agencies and a statistically significant number of data points. 
Table 37: Rating Types 
Code Name 
Sufficient 
Data  CBRS DBRS Fitch Moody's S&P  
We Will 
Use 
1 Asset Backed Short Term   9 9 9 9 9    
2 Bank Financial Strength 9     9   9 
3 Bank Loan Debt     9 9     
4 CC LT Foreign Bank Depst      9     
5 CC LT Foreign Curr Debt      9     
6 CC ST Foreign Curr Debt           
7 Claims Paying ability    9       
8 Commercial Paper           
9 Corporate Credit 9  9 9     9 
10 Cummulative Preferred 9  9 9  9   9 
11 Equity Linked   9 9 9 9     
12 FC Curr Issuer Rating 9     9     
13 Financial Strength     9  9    
14 Finl Strength Outlook           
15 Foreign Currency LT Debt    9 9 9 9    
16 Foreign Currency ST Debt     9 9 9    
17 Foreign LT Bank Deposits           
18 Government Issues 9  9        
19 Insurance Finl Strength      9     
20 Insurance Paying Ability           
21 Investment Strength 9  9      9 
22 Issuer Rating 9     9   9 
23 JR Subordinated Debt   9 9 9 9     
24 LC Curr Issuer Rating      9     
25 Local Currency LT Debt    9 9 9 9    
26 Local Currency ST Debt      9 9    
27 Local LT Bank Deposits      9     
28 Long Term 9    9    9 
29 Long Term Bank Deposits   9 9 9 9     
30 Long Term Counterparty 9  9   9   9 
31 Long Term Issuer Credit           
32 Long Term Outlook 9      9   
33 LT Credit Outlook       9    
34 LT Foreign Crncy Outlook 9      9    
35 LT Foreign Issuer Credit       9    
36 LT Local Crncy Outlook 9      9    
37 LT Local Issuer Credit       9    
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38 Mortgage Debt           
39 Non-Cumm. Preferred 9  9 9 9 9   9 
40 Outlook    9 9 9 9    
41 Preference Stock    9  9     
42 Preferred 9  9 9     9 
43 Preferred Stock   9 9 9 9     
44 Senior Debt 9        9 
45 Senior Implied Issuer 9     9   9 
46 Senior Secured Debt 9  9 9 9 9 9  9 
47 Senior Subordinate 9  9 9 9 9   9 
48 Senior Unsecured Debt 9  9 9 9 9   9 
49 Short Term   9 9 9 9     
50 Short Term Issuer Credit       9    
51 Short Term Outlook           
52 ST Foreign Issuer Credit 9      9   
53 ST Local Issuer Credit 9      9   
54 Subordinated Debt   9 9 9 9     
  
 
Appendix  6: Industry Assignments 
To aggregate by industry, the following industry classifications were used. This industry 
allocation scheme was performed to achieve the aim of aggregating into a small number of 
distinct industry types. It does not exactly follow the North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS) that is the standard one used for classifying industries within Canada, Mexico 
and the United States. There are two reasons for this: First, the data also includes Australia, and 
second, the aim was to achieve a small number of industry groups, and a custom grouping that 
follows the same philosophy as NAICS can arrive at the desired number of industry groupings. 
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Table 38: Industry groups
Code Name Category 
1 Advertising Agencies  Advertising 
1 Advertising Services  Advertising 
2 Aerospace/Defense  Aerospace 
2 Aerospace/Defense-Equip  Aerospace 
3 Agricultural Operations  Agriculture 
3 Pastoral&Agricultural  Agriculture 
4 Beverages-Non-alcoholic  Beverages 
4 Beverages-Wine/Spirits  Beverages 
4 Brewery  Beverages 
5 Agricultural Chemicals  Chemical 
5 Chemicals-Diversified  Chemical 
5 Chemicals-Fibers Chemical 
5 Chemicals-Other Chemical 
5 Chemicals-Plastics  Chemical 
5 Chemicals-Specialty  Chemical 
5 Coatings/Paint Chemical 
6 Apparel Manufacturers Clothing 
6 Athletic Footwear Clothing 
6 Athletic Equipment Clothing 
6 Intimate Apparel Clothing 
6 Footwear&Related Apparel Clothing 
7 B2B/E-Commerce Commercial 
7 Commercial Services  Commercial 
7 Distribution/Wholesale  Commercial 
7 Divers Oper/Commer Serv  Commercial 
7 Diversified Operations  Commercial 
7 Funeral Serv&Rel Items  Commercial 
7 Import/Export  Commercial 
7 Office Supplies&Forms  Commercial 
7 Printing-Commercial  Commercial 
7 Rental Auto/Equipment  Commercial 
7 Storage/Warehousing  Commercial 
8 Coal  Commodity 
8 Diversified Minerals  Commodity 
8 Fisheries  Commodity 
8 Forestry  Commodity 
8 Gold Mining  Commodity 
8 Invest Comp - Resources  Commodity 
8 Metal-Aluminum  Commodity 
8 Metal-Copper Commodity 
8 Metal-Diversified  Commodity 
8 Metal-Iron  Commodity 
8 Mining Services  Commodity 
8 Non-Ferrous Metals  Commodity 
8 Oil Comp-Explor&Prodtn  Commodity 
8 Oil Comp-Integrated  Commodity 
8 Oil Field Mach&Equip Commodity 
8 Oil Refining&Marketing Commodity 
8 Oil&Gas Drilling  Commodity 
8 Oil-Field Services  Commodity 
8 Pipelines  Commodity 
8 Platinum Commodity 
8 Precious Metals Commodity 
8 Quarrying Commodity 
8 Steel-Producers  Commodity 
8 Sugar  Commodity 
8 Wool Commodity 
9 Airport Develop/Maint  Construction 
9 Bldg Prod-Air&Heating  Construction 
9 Bldg Prod-Cement/Aggreg  Construction 
9 Bldg Prod-Doors&Windows  Construction 
9 Bldg Prod-Light Fixtures Construction 
9 Bldg Prod-Wood  Construction 
9 Bldg&Construct Prod-Misc Construction 
9 Bldg-Mobil Home/Mfd Hous Construction 
9 Bldg-Residential/Commer  Construction 
9 Building&Construct-Misc  Construction 
9 Building-Heavy Construct Construction 
9 Building-Maint&Service  Construction 
10 Schools-Day Care Education 
11 Casino Hotels Entertainment & Rec 
11 Casino Services Entertainment & Rec 
11 Cruise Lines Entertainment & Rec 
11 Gambling (Non-Hotel)  Entertainment & Rec 
11 Golf Entertainment & Rec 
11 Leisure&Rec Products  Entertainment & Rec 
11 Music Entertainment & Rec 
11 Night Clubs  Entertainment & Rec 
11 Professional Sports Entertainment & Rec 
11 Racetracks Entertainment & Rec 
11 Recreational Centers Entertainment & Rec 
11 Resorts/Theme Parks  Entertainment & Rec 
11 Theaters Entertainment & Rec 
12 Building Societies Finance 
12 Closed-end Funds  Finance 
12 Commer Banks Non-US  Finance 
12 Commer Banks-Central US  Finance 
12 Commer Banks-Eastern US  Finance 
12 Commer Banks-Southern US Finance 
12 Commer Banks-Western US Finance 
12 Commercial Serv-Finance  Finance 
12 Cooperative Banks  Finance 
12 Diversified Finan Serv  Finance 
12 Export/Import Bank Finance 
12 Fiduciary Banks Finance 
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12 Finance-Auto Loans  Finance 
12 Finance-Commercial Finance 
12 Finance-Consumer Loans  Finance 
12 Finance-Credit Card  Finance 
12 Finance-Invest Bnkr/Brkr Finance 
12 Finance-Investment Fund Finance 
12 Finance-Leasing Compan  Finance 
12 Finance-Mtge Loan/Banker Finance 
12 Finance-Other Services  Finance 
12 Internet Financial Svcs Finance 
12 Invest Mgmnt/Advis Serv  Finance 
12 Investment Companies  Finance 
12 Money Center Banks  Finance 
12 Mortgage Banks  Finance 
12 Regional Bank  Finance 
12 Regional Banks-Non US Finance 
12 S&L/Thrifts-Central US Finance 
12 S&L/Thrifts-Eastern US Finance 
12 S&L/Thrifts-Southern US Finance 
12 S&L/Thrifts-Western US Finance 
12 Special Purpose Banks  Finance 
12 Special Purpose Entity  Finance 
12 Specified Purpose Acquis Finance 
12 Super-Regional Banks-US  Finance 
12 Supranational Bank Finance 
12 Venture Capital Finance 
13 Food-Baking Food 
13 Food-Canned Food 
13 Food-Catering  Food 
13 Food-Confectionery Food 
13 Food-Dairy Products  Food 
13 Food-Meat Products Food 
13 Food-Misc/Diversified  Food 
13 Food-Retail  Food 
13 Food-Wholesale/Distrib  Food 
13 Poultry  Food 
14 Municipal-City  Government 
14 Municipal-County  Government 
14 Municipal-Education  Government 
14 Municipal-Local Auth  Government 
14 Public Thoroughfares  Government 
14 Regional Agencies  Government 
14 Regional Authority  Government 
14 Schools  Government 
14 Sovereign  Government 
14 Sovereign Agency  Government 
15 Cosmetics&Toiletries  Healthcare 
15 Dental Supplies&Equip Healthcare 
15 Diagnostic Kits Healthcare 
15 Dialysis Centers Healthcare 
15 Disposable Medical Prod Healthcare 
15 Drug Delivery Systems Healthcare 
15 Health Care Cost Contain Healthcare 
15 Hospital Beds/Equipment Healthcare 
15 Feminine Health Care Prd Healthcare 
15 Medical Instruments Healthcare 
15 Medical Labs&Testing Srv Healthcare 
15 Medical Products  Healthcare 
15 Medical-Biomedical/Gene Healthcare 
15 Medical-Drugs  Healthcare 
15 Medical-Generic Drugs Healthcare 
15 Medical-HMO Healthcare 
15 Medical-Hospitals  Healthcare 
15 Medical-Nursing Homes  Healthcare 
15 Medical-Outptnt/Home Med Healthcare 
15 Medical-Whsle Drug Dist  Healthcare 
15 MRI/Medical Diag Imaging Healthcare 
15 Optical Supplies Healthcare 
15 Pharmacy Services Healthcare 
15 Phys Practice Mgmnt Healthcare 
15 Phys Therapy/Rehab Cntrs Healthcare 
15 Respiratory Products Healthcare 
15 Retirement/Aged Care  Healthcare 
15 Therapeutics Healthcare 
15 Veterinary Diagnostics Healthcare 
15 Vitamins&Nutrition Prod Healthcare 
16 Financial Guarantee Ins Insurance 
16 Insurance Brokers  Insurance 
16 Life/Health Insurance  Insurance 
16 Multi-line Insurance  Insurance 
16 Mutual Insurance  Insurance 
16 Property/Casualty Ins  Insurance 
16 Reinsurance Insurance 
17 Advanced Materials/Prd Manufacturing 
17 Appliances  Manufacturing 
17 Audio/Video Products Manufacturing 
17 Batteries/Battery Sys Manufacturing 
17 Ceramic Products Manufacturing 
17 Consumer Products-Misc  Manufacturing 
17 Containers-Metal/Glass  Manufacturing 
17 Containers-Paper/Plastic Manufacturing 
17 Diagnostic Equipment Manufacturing 
17 Diversified Manufact Op  Manufacturing 
17 Electronic Connectors Manufacturing 
17 Engines-Internal Combust Manufacturing 
17 Filtration/Separat Prod Manufacturing 
17 Garden Products Manufacturing 
17 Home Furnishings Manufacturing 
17 Home Decoration Products Manufacturing 
17 Housewares Manufacturing 
 74
17 Industrial Gases Manufacturing 
17 Mach Tools&Rel Products  Manufacturing 
17 Machinery-Constr&Mining  Manufacturing 
17 Machinery-Electrical  Manufacturing 
17 Machinery-Farm  Manufacturing 
17 Machinery-General Indust Manufacturing 
17 Machinery-Machinery Handl Manufacturing 
17 Machinery-Material Handl Manufacturing 
17 Machinery-Pumps Manufacturing 
17 Metal Processors&Fabrica Manufacturing 
17 Metal Products-Fasteners Manufacturing 
17 Miscellaneous Manufactur Manufacturing 
17 Office Furnishings-Orig Manufacturing 
17 Optical Recognition Equi Manufacturing 
17 Paper&Related Products  Manufacturing 
17 Photo Equipment&Supplies Manufacturing 
17 Rubber/Plastic Products Manufacturing 
17 Rubber-Tires Manufacturing 
17 Soap&Cleaning Prepar Manufacturing 
17 Shipbuilding Manufacturing 
17 Steel Pipe&Tube Manufacturing 
17 Steel-Specialty Manufacturing 
17 Textile-Apparel Manufacturing 
17 Textile-Home Furnishings Manufacturing 
17 Textile-Products  Manufacturing 
17 Tobacco  Manufacturing 
17 Tools-Hand Held Manufacturing 
17 Toys  Manufacturing 
17 Wire&Cable Products Manufacturing 
18 Broadcast Serv/Program Media 
18 Cable TV  Media 
18 Industr Audio&Video Prod Media 
18 Internet Content-Info/Ne Media 
18 Motion Pictures&Services Media 
18 Multimedia  Media 
18 Publishing-Books Media 
18 Publishing-Newspapers  Media 
18 Publishing-Periodicals Media 
18 Radio Media 
18 Television  Media 
19 Hotels&Motels  Real Estate 
19 Property Trust Real Estate 
19 Real Estate Mgmnt/Servic Real Estate 
19 Real Estate Oper/Develop Real Estate 
19 REITS-Apartments  Real Estate 
19 REITS-Diversified  Real Estate 
19 REITS-Health Care  Real Estate 
19 REITS-Hotels  Real Estate 
19 REITS-Manufactured Homes Real Estate 
19 REITS-Mortgage Real Estate 
19 REITS-Office Property Real Estate 
19 REITS-Regional Malls Real Estate 
19 REITS-Shopping Centers  Real Estate 
19 REITS-Single Tenant Real Estate 
19 REITS-Storage Real Estate 
19 REITS-Warehouse/Industr Real Estate 
20 Retail-Apparel/Shoe  Retail 
20 Retail-Arts&Crafts Retail 
20 Retail-Auto Parts  Retail 
20 Retail-Automobile Retail 
20 Retail-Bedding Retail 
20 Retail-Bookstore Retail 
20 Retail-Building Products Retail 
20 Retail-Catalog Shopping Retail 
20 Retail-Computer Equip Retail 
20 Retail-Consumer Electron Retail 
20 Retail-Convenience Store Retail 
20 Retail-Discount  Retail 
20 Retail-Drug Store  Retail 
20 Retail-Fabric Store Retail 
20 Retail-Home Furnishings Retail 
20 Retail-Jewelry Retail 
20 Retail-Leisure Products Retail 
20 Retail-Mail Order Retail 
20 Retail-Major Dept Store  Retail 
20 Retail-Misc/Diversified  Retail 
20 Retail-Music Store Retail 
20 Retail-Office Supplies Retail 
20 Retail-Pet Food&Supplies Retail 
20 Retail-Petroleum Prod  Retail 
20 Retail-Propane Distrib Retail 
20 Retail-Regnl Dept Store  Retail 
20 Retail-Restaurants  Retail 
20 Retail-Sporting Goods Retail 
20 Retail-Toy Store Retail 
20 Retail-Video Rental Retail 
20 Retail-Vision Serv Cntr Retail 
20 Retail-Vitamins/Nutr Sup Retail 
21 Advertising Sales Services 
21 Auction House/Art Dealer Services 
21 Collectibles Services 
21 Computer Services Services 
21 Consulting Services Services 
21 Direct Marketing Services 
21 E-Marketing/Info Services 
21 Engineering/R&D Services Services 
21 E-Services/Consulting Services 
21 Human Resources Services 
21 Internet Security Services 
21 Lottery Services Services 
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21 Marine Services Services 
21 Multilevel Dir Selling Services 
21 Non-Profit Charity Services 
21 Private Corrections Services 
21 Protection-Safety Services 
21 Security Services Services 
21 Seismic Data Collection Services 
21 Traffic Management Sys Services 
21 Travel Services Services 
22 Agricultural Biotech Technology 
22 Applications Software Technology 
22 Circuit Boards Technology 
22 Communications Software Technology 
22 Computer Aided Design Technology 
22 Computer Software Technology 
22 Computers Technology 
22 Computers-Integrated Sys Technology 
22 Computers-Memory Devices Technology 
22 Computers-Peripher Equip Technology 
22 Data Processing/Mgmt Technology 
22 Decision Support Softwar Technology 
22 Drug Detection Systems Technology 
22 E-Commerce/Products Technology 
22 E-Commerce/Services Technology 
22 Educational Software Technology 
22 Electric Products-Misc Technology 
22 Electronic Compo-Misc  Technology 
22 Electronic Compo-Semicon Technology 
22 Electronic Measur Instr Technology 
22 Electronics-Military Technology 
22 Enterprise Software/Serv Technology 
22 Entertainment Software Technology 
22 Industrial Automat/Robot Technology 
22 Instruments-Controls Technology 
22 Instruments-Scientific Technology 
22 Internet Applic Sftwr Technology 
22 Internet Infrastr Sftwr  Technology 
22 Medical Information Sys Technology 
22 Networking Products Technology 
22 Office Automation&Equip  Technology 
22 Research&Development Technology 
22 Semicon Compo-Intg Circu Technology 
22 Semiconductor Equipment Technology 
22 Transactional Software Technology 
22 Web Portals/ISP Technology 
22 X-Ray Equipment Technology 
23 Cellular Telecom  Telecom 
23 Satellite Telecom  Telecom 
23 Telecom Eq Fiber Optics  Telecom 
23 Telecom Services  Telecom 
23 Telecommunication Equip  Telecom 
23 Telephone-Integrated  Telecom 
23 Wireless Equipment  Telecom 
24 Airlines  Transport 
24 Auto Repair Centers  Transport 
24 Auto/Trk Prts&Equip-Orig Transport 
24 Auto/Trk Prts&Equip-Repl Transport 
24 Auto-Cars/Light Trucks  Transport 
24 Auto-Med&Heavy Duty Trks Transport 
24 Electronic Parts Distrib Transport 
24 Motorcycle/Motor Scooter Transport 
24 Transport-Air Freight  Transport 
24 Transport-Equip&Leasng Transport 
24 Transport-Marine  Transport 
24 Transport-Rail  Transport 
24 Transport-Services  Transport 
24 Transport-Truck Transport 
24 Whsing&Harbor Trans Serv Transport 
0 Inactive/Unknown  Unknown 
0 N.A. Unknown 
0 N/A Unknown 
25 Air Pollution Control Eq Utility 
25 Alternative Waste Tech Utility 
25 Electric-Distribution  Utility 
25 Electric-Generation  Utility 
25 Electric-Integrated  Utility 
25 Electric-Transmission  Utility 
25 Energy-Alternate Sources Utility 
25 Gas-Distribution  Utility 
25 Gas-Transportation  Utility 
25 Hazardous Waste Disposal Utility 
25 Independ Power Producer  Utility 
25 Non-hazardous Waste Disp Utility 
25 Pollution Control  Utility 
25 Power Conv/Supply Equip  Utility 
25 Recycling  Utility 
25 Remediation Services  Utility 
25 Utilities Utility 
25 Water  Utility 
25 Water Treatment Systems Utility 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Indian Companies' ADRs/GDRs Premiums, Discounts for July 5 
2005-07-04 18:30 (New York) 
 
     July 5 (Bloomberg) -- The following table of American and global depositary receipts of 
Indian companies compares their closing prices with the most recent closes in local trading. 
Price adjustments are based on a currency value of 43.55 rupee per dollar, along with the 
number of shares per ADR or GDR.  
      
                     ADR/GDR                  Local     Local  ADR/GDR  Shares/  
Company              Ticker  Close  % Chg    Equiv.     Close   % Prem   ADR/GDR 
Dr Reddy's           RDY     17.10  +1.06    744.62    775.90    -4.03       1.0 
HDFC Bank            HDB     47.89  +2.97    695.12    631.70   +10.04       3.0 
ICICI Bank           IBN     22.00  +0.69    479.00    429.15   +11.61       2.0 
Infosys Technologies INFY    76.47  -1.46  3,329.89  2,394.85   +39.04       1.0 
MTNL                 MTE      6.58  +3.95    143.26    121.85   +17.57       2.0 
Ranbaxy Labs         RBXD    24.70  -0.04  1,075.56  1,078.40    -0.26       1.0 
Reliance Industries  RIGD    29.53  +1.48    642.94    643.85    -0.14       2.0 
Satyam Computers     SAY     26.40  +1.54    574.79    511.00   +12.48       2.0 
State Bank of India  SBID    41.75  +0.60    909.00    710.60   +27.92       2.0 
Tata Motors          TTM      9.70  +0.21    422.39    426.75    -1.02       1.0 
Wipro                WIT     20.58  -1.34    896.16    744.00   +20.45       1.0 
      
Companies are listed based on a market capitalization of more than $1 billion, average daily 
trading of at least 1,000 ADRs or GDRs during the last three months, and a history of 
trading at least four days a week. 
 
      
--New Delhi newsroom, 91-11-5179-2020 
 
11 Indian companies have their ADRs listed on the stock exchanges in the US. 
The above article provides a list of the companies with ADRs listed in US, along with 
data regarding ADR prices in US, the underlying equity share prices in the Indian stock 
markets and the premium at which these ADRs are trading in the US stock markets vis-à-
vis price of the underlying equity in Indian stock market.  
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Exhibit I a
Company Listing in US stock Markets
Infosys Technologies Mar-99
Wipro Oct-00
ICICI Bank Mar-00
Satyam Computers May-01
HDFC Bank Jul-01
MTNL Jan-98  
We observe that in case of Infosys, Wipro, State Bank of India and MTNL the 
premium is substantial (> 15%) while in the case ICICI Bank, HDFC Bank and Satyam 
Computers, the ADR premium is a material figure. What is pertinent is the fact that these 
premiums are not a one time aberration but have been in existence for a long time (in 
case of Infosys, the premium of >30% can be traced back to its listing in the US in March 
1999). Most of the ADRs have been listed in the US for some time but continue to trade 
at premiums. Exhibit I a indicates when some of the Indian companies were listed in the 
US. 
 
If we accept the notion of efficiency of stock markets (no matter to what degree), 
it seems improbable that such significant premiums can be allowed to exist for long by 
arbitrageurs. The very fact that this data is being reported daily on Bloomberg means that 
the ADR premiums are public knowledge. 
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Exhibit I b
Economy # of stocks Date
Average ADR 
premium Maximum Minimum
India 11 5-Jul-05 12.15% 39.04% -4.03%
Germany 18 5-Jul-05 0.26% 0.96% -1.58%
China (listed Hong Kong)* 15 5-Jul-05 0.15% 2.44% -1.76%
South Korea 11 6-Jul-05 1.32% 6.22% -1.41%
Hong Kong 17 4-Jul-05 -0.14% 2.22% -2.59%
Taiwan 13 4-Jul-05 1.95% 12.51% -2.70%
Singapore 4 5-Jul-05 -0.14% 1.35% -1.77%
Australia 19 4-Jul-05 0.41% 3.12% -1.35%
UK 48 5-Jul-05 1.23% 4.48% -5.35%
*excludes Yanzhou Coal, a significant outlier  
To check whether this phenomenon is peculiar to Indian ADRs only, we analyzed 
the premiums at which ADRs of other countries trade in the US. We included ADRs from 
Germany, South Korea, China (shares listed in Hong Kong), Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Australia and UK in our sample. The results are presented in Exhibit I b. 
 
We observe that Indian ADRs not only trade at a relatively higher premium 
compared to other ADRs, but also at a significant premium in absolute terms. The highest 
ADR premium for India is 39% (Infosys). In fact, apart from Taiwan, ADRs of countries 
other than India trade at negligible premiums. This makes the phenomenon of Indian 
ADR premiums remarkable. 
  
The phenomenon of existence of ADR premiums can be compared to at least 3 
other cases in contemporary finance, viz. 
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• Royal Dutch/ Shell group conundrum – Royal Dutch Shell group was a joint 
venture between Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (RDP) of the Netherlands and 
the Shell Transport and Trading Company plc (STT) of UK in the ratio of 60:40. 
Even though RDP and STT had rights to cash flows of Royal Dutch Shell in 
60:40 ratio (and no other assets), their share prices were never in 60:40 ratio i.e. 
cash flows with similar risk-return characteristics were valued differently by same 
set of investors. 
• The closed end mutual fund puzzle – Closed end funds trade at a discount to their 
NAVs. This is a puzzle since prima facie there is no reason why the market price 
for a closed-end fund is usually different from the current value of the portfolio 
held by the fund, or its net asset value (NAV). In this regard, we would take a 
look at the closed end India Fund (IFN), its price versus NAV in Section IV 
(Investigating ADR premiums). 1 
• 3Com/Palm case – In September 1999, 3Com announced its intentions to carve 
out Palm Computing, and subsequently spin it off. When Palm started traded 
publicly in March 2000, the market cap of Palm was $53.4 billion, much higher 
than 3Com’s $28.5 billion value, even though 3Com still owned 94% of Palm and 
also other assets. Based on 3Com’s 94% ownership, 3Com’s stake in Palm was 
worth approximately $50 billion, giving substantial negative value to 3Com’s 
other assets, an almost perfect violation of the law of one price. 2 
                                                 
1 “Asymmetric Information and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle” - Oh & Ross 1993 
“Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle” – Lee, Shleifer & Thaler 1990 
 
2 “The Valuation and Market Rationality of Internet Stock Prices” – Ofek & Richardson, 2001 
“The Parent Company Puzzle – When is the whole less than one of its parts?” – Cornell & Liu, 2000 
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Research Objectives 
 
This research aims to analyze the continued existence of premiums on Indian 
ADRs over the last 3-4 years and investigate the  reasons for the same. If any security, 
carrying the same risk-reward characteristics, trades at two different prices in different 
markets, the arbitrageurs will soon step in to take advantage of the situation, till the time 
the security trades at one price, across all markets. That has not happened in the case of 
these Indian ADRs.  
 
The paper looks at the following possible sources of the premium: 
 
1. Legal / Institutional: Laws regarding capital account transactions in India, 
including the rules and exact procedures for investment by foreign nationals in Indian 
securities market and repatriation of those funds. If the foreign nationals have limited or 
no access to Indian stock markets, it is probable that ADRs in the US markets are valued 
under different assumptions compared to the valuation of underlying equity in the Indian 
stock markets (which is, to an extent, same as saying that the two securities have two 
different bodies of investors, with different expectations and assumptions).  
2. Liquidity: Measuring the relative liquidity of ADRs in the US to the underlying 
stock in India, which may be a partial cause of the premiums. In case the liquidity of 
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ADRs is higher, the ADRS would carry certain liquidity premium vis-à-vis equity listed 
on the Indian stock markets. 
3. Risk preferences: The investors may assign different risk-reward characteristics to 
Indian equities and Indian ADRs on account of currency risk, repatriation risk or risk of 
procedural delays in security transactions in India. This may also result in a premium on 
ADRs.  
 
The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections. Section II focuses on 
analyzing the ADR premiums, their trends and correlations with concerned stock markets 
and securities. Section III attempts to delineate the differences between institutional 
frameworks that govern capital account transactions in India and three vibrant economies 
in world markets – Germany, Hong Kong and South Korea. We attempt to analyze 
whether these differences may be causing ADR premiums. Section IV covers an 
investigation of the likely causes of ADR premiums. 
Section V summarizes our findings and analyses. 
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II ANALYSIS OF ADR PREMIUMS OVER TIME 
This section divided into two parts. Part A is aimed at analyzing the trends in 
ADR premiums and the movement in ADR premium levels in recent years. Part B 
explores the relationship between returns on ADRs with the returns on the underlying 
equity, and with the returns on broad market indices (viz S&P 500 and the Bombay 
Sensex in India). The analyses in this section would help us put the issue of ADR 
premiums in perspective, against a backdrop of long terms trends in ADR premiums, and 
the relationship of ADRs with underlying equity and the US and Indian stock markets. 
A. Trend Analysis of the ADR Premiums 
We have analyzed the ADR premiums trend over a period of last 5 years. The 
results are detailed in Exhibit II a. 
 
Graphically, we present Exhibit II b - d, the ADRs with relatively the highest 
premiums over time among Indian ADRs.  
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Exhibit II a
ADR Stock Ticker 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average
Dr Reddy's RDY 7% 2% 1% 3% 2% 3%
HDFC Bank HDB 5% 8% 14% 21% 12% 12%
ICICI Bank IBN 3% 13% 16% 15% 11% 12%
Infosys INFY 57% 61% 46% 49% 36% 50%
MTNL MTE 5% 1% 1% 21% 15% 9%
Ranbaxy Lab. RBXD 13% 8% 9% 2% 1% 7%
Reliance Industries RIGD 38% 38% 37% 43% 31% 37%
Satyam Computers SAY 15% 10% 24% 45% 21% 23%
SBI SBID 8% 18% 29% 31% 26% 22%
Tata Motors TTM 0 0 0 1% 0% 0%
Wipro WIT 2% 3% 12% 37% 27% 16%
Average 14% 15% 17% 24% 16% 17%  
Exhibit II b
Indian Technology Companies 
ADR premiums over time
Wipro
Infosys
Satyam Computers
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 
We observe that ADRs in information technology sectors have historically traded 
at premiums. We also observe that Infosys exhibits the highest premium among Indian 
ADRs (almost 60% in 2002), but the premium is trending down and is almost half of its 5 
year high in 2005. In fact, currently the Infosys ADR premium is around 17%, which 
certainly is remarkable given the fact that it is a historic low. Wipro and Satyam 
Computers, in contrast, had low ADR premiums initially, peaked at 35%-45% in 2004 
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and trended down to over 20% in 2005. Currently, Wipro trades at 24% ADR premium 
while Satyam trades at 16% premium. 
Exhibit II c
Indian Banking Companies
ADR premiums over time
HDFC Bank
ICICI Bank
SBI
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The banking sector of India has shown continued strength, and it is, therefore, no 
surprise that the bellwethers of Indian banking sector, State Bank of India (SBI), ICICI 
Bank and HDFC Bank, have shown continuous increase in ADR premiums till 2004. In 
2005, however, premiums on all three ADRs has declined significantly. Currently, these 
banking sector ADRs trade at 13%-15% premiums. 
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Exhibit II d
Other Indian Companies
ADR premiums over time
MTNL
Ranbaxy Lab.
Reliance Industries
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Of the remaining ADRs, in our sample, Reliance Industries has maintained the 
most stable premium of 30-40% in last 5 years, but in 2006, the premium is down to 
<5%. While MTNL ADR premium declined to almost 0% by 2003, Ranbaxy’s hovered 
around low teens and high single digits in 2001-03. In the last two years (i.e. 2004 & 
2005) MTNL ADR premiums have shot up to over 15%, while Ranbaxy’s declined 
precipitously to almost zero.1 Two other ADRs in our sample, Dr Reddy’s 
(Pharmaceuticals) and Tata Motors (Automobiles) have shown negligible premiums 
(<5%) for the period under study. 
 
Across the board, however Indian ADRs have shown a decline in ADR premiums 
over the period 2001-2005. The simple average for 11 ADRs has declined from 2004 
high of 24% to 16% in 2005 and was only 11% in February 2006. 
 
                                                 
1 MTNL and Ranbaxy recently had their GDRs converted to ADRs, so the data relates partly to GDRs 
and partly to ADRs. Reliance (RIGD) is a GDR. 
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A trend analysis of all 11 ADRs has been conducted. The results shown a clear 
downtrend in ADR premiums over time, which indicates that the cause of ADR 
premiums is somehow being removed, or corrected, if you will, over time.  
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Trend Analysis of ADR premiums over 2001-2005  
(Please refer to Appendix V for trend analysis of the entire sample of Indian ADRs) 
 
ICICI Bank (IBN) 
 
Month
Ib
n
SepMarSepMarSepMarSepMarSepMar
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
-0.05
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 65.6312
MAD 0.0520
MSD 0.0038
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Ibn
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = -0.0130895 + 0.00986889*t - 0.000138528*t**2
 
 
 
Infosys Technologies (INFY) 
 
Month
In
fy
SepMarSepMarSepMarSepMarSepMar
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 15.0745
MAD 0.0697
MSD 0.0075
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Infy
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = 0.568490 + 0.00168048*t - 0.000100089*t**2
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Satyam Computers (SAY) 
 
Month
Sa
y
SepMarSepMarSepMarSepMarSepMar
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 62.8986
MAD 0.1039
MSD 0.0173
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Say
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = -0.00101870 + 0.0167579*t - 0.000222420*t**2
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B. Risk – Return characteristics of ADRs  
 
Although the ADRs are a derivative of underlying equity, yet there exists a 
significant difference in the ADR prices compared to the price of underlying equity (i.e. 
the ADR premium). We look to understand the movements of ADR prices, vis-à-vis the 
underlying equity, the S&P 500 (where the ADRs trade),  and the Indian stock market i.e. 
the Bombay Sensex (where the underlying equity trade). Towards this end, we conduct a 
correlation and regression analysis of ADR returns versus underlying equity returns, S&P 
500 returns and Sensex returns. This would, to some extent, explain the movements in 
ADR premiums over time, by exhibiting the impact of US stock market movements, 
Indian stock market movements, and underlying equity price changes, on the ADR 
premiums. In this way, it would help us understand the relative sensitivity of ADRs to US 
stock markets versus the Indian stock markets, which may cause some divergence in 
prices of ADR and the underlying equity (i.e. the ADR premiums) 
 
To gain further insight into price movements of ADRs and Indian equity (which 
would to an extent, explain the movement in ADR premium), we conducted simple 
regression analyses of ADR returns, separately with Indian equity returns (adjusted for 
currency movements and ADR:Equity ratios), with S&P 500 Index returns and with 
Bombay Sensex index returns. This analysis has been conducted specifically for the 
period June 2004 to December 2005, when we have seen considerably decline in the 
ADR premiums. 
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Exhibit II e
ADR Name
S&P 500 Sensex Underlying Equity S&P 500 Sensex 
Underlying 
Equity S&P 500 Sensex 
Underlying 
Equity
Higher 
Correlation 
with
Correlation of 
less than 30% 
with underlying
Dr Reddy's 5.67 7.79 12.68 7.5% 13.6% 29.5% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% Sensex Yes
HDFC Bank 5.54 7.2 8.39 7.1% 11.9% 15.5% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% Sensex Yes
ICICI Bank 7.68 7.22 9.2 12.9% 11.9% 18.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% S&P 500 Yes
Infosys Technologies 7.53 5.94 7.57 12.4% 8.4% 13.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% S&P 500 Yes
MTNL 4.28 4.34 9.6 4.4% 4.7% 19.3% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% Sensex Yes
Ranbaxy Labs 0.67 7.66 24.92 0.1% 13.2% 62.2% 50.40% 0.00% 0.00% Sensex No
Reliance Industries 2.03 15.81 29.62 1.0% 39.2% 69.9% 4.30% 0.00% 0.00% Sensex No
Satyam Computers 8.33 6.07 8.24 14.8% 8.7% 15.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% S&P 500 Yes
State Bank of India 0.87 12.14 17.19 0.2% 27.6% 43.9% 38.70% 0.00% 0.00% Sensex No
Tata Motors 3.11 13.62 23.05 3.0% 38.0% 63.8% 0.20% 0.00% 0.00% Sensex No
Wipro 7.09 8.17 9.67 11.2% 14.8% 19.5% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% Sensex Yes
Average 5.32       9.33        13.96             7.8% 19.3% 33.6%
Bombay Sensex 1.21 0.4% 22.70%
T-Statistic versus R2 (Correlation) with P-value
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Exhibit II e contd.
ADR Name
S&P 500 Sensex Underlying Equity
Dr Reddy's 0.67       0.59        0.48               
HDFC Bank 0.81       0.67        0.44               
ICICI Bank 1.16       0.72        0.45               
Infosys Technologies 1.11       0.59        0.44               
MTNL 0.74       0.49        0.46               
Ranbaxy Labs 0.10       0.68        0.77               
Reliance Industries 0.28       1.11        0.92               
Satyam Computers 1.33       0.65        0.43               
State Bank of India 0.12       0.95        0.62               
Tata Motors 0.53       1.20        0.79               
Wipro 1.10       0.82        0.49               
Average 0.79       0.81        0.56               
Bombay Sensex 0.10       
Beta versus
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Exhibit II f
28-May-04 31-Dec-05
Change in 
S&P and 
ADR prices
28-May-04 31-Dec-05 28-May-04 31-Dec-05
Change 
in Sensex 
and 
Indian 
Equity
Difference 
in Price 
change
28-May-04 31-Dec-05 ∆ ADR Premium
$ $ Rs Rs 45.465 45.195
S&P 500 1,120.68                      1,248.29    11%
Sensex 4759.62 9397.93 104.69 207.94 99% 87%
RDY 18.52                           21.60         17% 887.55        978.50       19.52 21.65 11% -6% -5.1% -0.2% 4.9%
HDB 28.32                           50.90         80% 369.75        707.45       8.13 15.65 92% 12% 16.1% 8.4% -7.7%
IBN 12.87                           28.80         124% 246.35        584.70       5.42 12.94 139% 14% 18.8% 11.3% -7.5%
INFY 41.38                           80.86         95% 1,264.21     2,996.75    27.81 66.31 138% 42% 48.8% 21.9% -26.8%
MTE 5.83                             6.90           18% 111.70        144.20       2.46 3.19 30% 11% 18.6% 8.1% -10.5%
RBXD 10.88                           7.99           -27% 494.90        362.35       10.89 8.02 -26% 0% -0.1% -0.3% -0.2%
RIGD 21.35                           37.55         76% 331.57        684.34       7.29 15.14 108% 31% 46.4% 24.0% -22.4%
SAY 19.54                           36.59         87% 305.05        737.80       6.71 16.32 143% 55% 45.6% 12.1% -33.5%
SBID 24.45                           50.50         107% 484.85        907.45       10.66 20.08 88% -19% 14.6% 25.8% 11.1%
TTM* 8.97                             14.37         60% 403.35        653.00       8.87 14.45 63% 2% 1.1% -0.5% -1.7%
WIT 7.40                             11.95         61% 250.75        463.45       5.52 10.25 86% 23% 34.2% 16.5% -17.6%
Average 64% 79% 15% -10%
* prices as on Sep 30, 2004 and Dec 31, 2005 due to lack of prior trading data
ADR PremiumAdjusted for exchange ratePrice as on Price as on
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The data in Exhibit II e indicates that the ADR prices do not move in lock-step 
with the prices of Indian equity. This is substantiated by the regression analysis that we 
have conducted on the ADR returns versus Bombay Sensex, S&P 500 and the underlying 
equity returns. We find that ADRs, on average, exhibit a lower beta with the underlying 
equity (0.56) vis-à-vis the Sensex or S&P 500 (0.80). 
 
This is a surprising result. As mentioned earlier, the ADR is a derivative of the 
underlying equity, with exactly similar risk- return characteristics as the underlying 
equity. Given this fact, we would expect a beta near to 1 for ADR returns versus returns 
on the underlying equity. However, the average beta of ADRs with the underlying equity 
is only 0.56, (much lower than the average ADR beta of 0.81 for Sensex and average 
ADR beta of 0.79 for S&P 500). Thus, not only we have a difference in valuations of 
ADRs and underlying equity (the ADR premiums), but we also have changes in ADR 
premiums over time (as evidenced by lower sensitivity of ADRs to underlying equity 
price movements). Therefore a low beta should indicate an increase in ADR premiums 
during a bear run in the Indian stock market and a decline in ADR premiums when the 
Indian stock market is on a bull run (for e.g. from June 2004 onwards). 
 
This observation is substantiated in Exhibit II f, which gives us details of price 
movement in ADRs and Indian Equity over the period, June 2004 – December 2005. 
 
In general, we observe a decline in ADR premiums over this period. All ADRs 
(except RDY and SBID) have shown decline in ADR premiums and the average decline 
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is around 10%. At the same time the S&P 500 appreciated 11% vis-à-vis 99% 
appreciation in the Bombay Sensex (Indian Stock Market), a difference of 87%. 
However, ADR prices on an average increased only 64%, versus an average 79% 
increase in the prices of underlying equity shares – reflecting a beta of < 1 with the 
underlying equity  
 
It should be mentioned here that the correlation between the Bombay Sensex and 
S&P 500 is very low (0.4%) and the beta is quite insignificant (0.10). Given this data, it 
can be safely said that US stock markets and Indian stock markets are quite uncorrelated. 
 
It is interesting to note that Satyam Computers, Infosys and ICICI Bank have 
higher correlations and betas with S&P 500 than with the Sensex, and a correlation of 
less than 30% (average 33.6%) with the underlying equity. Wipro also has a higher beta 
with S&P 500 than with the Sensex, and a correlation of less than 30% (average 33.6%) 
with the underlying equity. These stocks, thus, move more in tandem with US stock 
markets, than with Indian stock markets. Interestingly, average ADR premium for these 
stocks is 25%, much higher than the average ADR premium of 17% 
 
Regression of ADR returns versus S&P 500 is significant in all cases, except 
MTNL, State Bank of India and Ranbaxy. The correlation of ADR returns with S&P500 
is on an average 7.8% (quite low), but is relatively high for Infosys, Wipro, Satyam 
Computers and ICICI Bank. The regression of ADR returns with Bombay Sensex and the 
underlying equity is significant in all cases and the correlations of ADR returns with the 
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Bombay Sensex and the underlying equity are also higher than the S&P 500 (average 
19.3% and 33.6%, respectively), which appears consistent with market facts (i.e. the 
ADR is a derivative of underlying Indian equity that trades in Indian stock market). At 
the same time, average ADR returns’ correlation with underlying equity is higher than 
with Sensex – again a consistent result. 
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III ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK1 
In this section, we focus on laws regarding capital account transaction in India, 
including the rules and exact procedures for investment by foreign nationals in Indian 
securities market and repatriation of those funds. In order to understand whether these 
laws maybe the reason for ADR premiums, we have also investigated laws regarding 
capital account transactions in Hong Kong, Germany, and South Korea (whose ADRs do 
not carry any significant premiums at all – refer Section I) 
 
Portfolio investment is relatively straightforward in India. Even retail investors 
can trade freely via a sub-account with any registered Foreign Institutional Investor (FII). 
We find that there are virtually no restrictions on portfolio investment in Germany, Hong 
Kong and South Korea, too. Repatriation of capital, profits and dividends is also free of 
any restrictions in India, Germany, Hong Kong and South Korea. As far as these factors 
are concerned, Indian capital markets have the same structure as developed capital 
markets (like Germany) and some vibrant emerging markets (like Hong Kong and South 
Korea). 
Please refer Appendix I for details. 
There is, however a crucial difference in ADR provisions of India and these 
countries. It is possible to convert ADRs into equity shares and conversely, equity shares 
into ADRs, without restrictions, in Germany, Hong Kong and South Korea. In India, the 
rules are different. The ADRs have only “limited two way fungibility”. What this implies 
                                                 
1 Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist 
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is that ADRs can be freely converted to equity shares, but equity shares in India can be 
converted to ADRs only to the extent of past conversion of ADRs in that company into 
shares. This is technically called “headroom”. If no ADR has been converted back into 
equity shares, it implies that no investor can buy shares in India and convert those shares 
into ADRs. The implication of ‘headroom’ provision is that if ADRs trade at a premium, 
it is not possible to conduct an arbitrage (i.e. short ADR and go long the Indian equity), 
because Indian equity cannot be converted into ADR (to close out the short sale), unless 
head room is available. 
 
As mentioned above, ‘headroom” is required in an ADR issue to allow arbitrage 
to happen. From my discussions with professionals in investment management, it appears 
that all the headroom has expired long time back and so conversion of local shares to 
ADR through this route is not possible right now. However, it is difficult to obtain the 
accurate and comprehensive information about “headroom” available for different ADRs, 
in terms of either current or historical data. 
 
In the absence of “headroom”, it is difficult to convert Indian equity shares into 
ADRs (due to limited fungibility). Any arbitrage by way of short selling ADRs in US and 
buying the underlying security in India seems not possible. In that, the ADR provisions 
are certainly different from a developed market like Germany and emerging markets like 
Hong Kong and South Korea. It is realistically not possible to readily convert Indian 
equity shares into ADRs listed on the US equity markets, which makes it difficult for any 
investor to take advantage of ADR premiums.  
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Given the fact that “headroom” is not available, and ADR are trading at a 
premium, it implies that the higher ADR price is caused by the following factors: 
1. Segmentation in the US and the Indian stock markets. This means that ADR and 
Indian equity are being valued differently by investors in these two separate markets. 
2. Whether or not “headroom” is available, the existence of ADR premiums can be 
explained partially by (1) liquidity premium, (2) currency risk premium, and (3) cost 
for transactions / procedural hassles. 
Section IV of the paper will investigate these questions. 
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IV INVESTIGATING ADR PREMIUMS 
 
As discussed in Section I, we now return to an investigation into the reasons that 
may be the cause of ADR premiums. The following issues will be investigated in detail to 
gain insights into the reasons causing the residual ADR premiums 
 
Liquidity Premium 
  
Given the obvious ease of investing in ADRs, there is no doubt about their 
demand in the US, especially for an increasingly attractive success story like the Indian 
economy. If ADRs offer better liquidity than the underlying equity, it can be argued that 
the ADRs would be more attractive to investors who prefer liquidity.  
 
It would be instructive to analyze the shareholding pattern of the ADRs and the 
underlying equity to investigate whether a relatively higher proportion of ADRs are 
owned by Institutional Investors (who prefer liquidity). Presuming ADRs are primarily 
held by Institutional Investors or broadly by investors who value liquidity (i.e. investors 
who trade a lot), the liquidity factor become important and may justify premiums on 
ADR prices. 
 
There are several methods that have been used in the finance literature for 
gauging illiquidity which can be roughly divided into price-based measures (like the daily 
bid-ask spread divided by daily price) and volume-based measures (like daily trading 
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volume divided by shares outstanding). We have used a measure formulated by Amihud 
(2002) for gauging liquidity of ADRs and underlying equity. Amihud’s measure 
calculates the average of daily ratio of absolute return to dollar trading volume. 
                                                                   Dt 
Specifically, Amihud’s measure =     1    Σ │Radr i,d │ 
                                                           Dt    d=1      Voladr i, d  
 
where Dt is the number of trading days in month t,  Radr i,d is the daily return of 
ADR i on day d (within month t), and  the Voladr i, d is dollar trading volume of ADR i on 
day d, defined as number of shares traded times the ADR price on day d. 
 
We use Amihud's (2002) liquidity measure for estimating the impact of liquidity 
on ADR premia. We calculated the daily Amihud measure for both the ADR and the 
underlying equity in Indian markets for the period from January 2001 to December 2005. 
The daily Amihud measure differential is then calculated in % terms in the following 
way; [Daily Amihud Measure (ADR)/Daily Amihud Measure (Indian equity) – 1]. This 
Daily Amihud Measure differential has then been used to derive monthly averages for 
each ADR from January 2001 to December 2005. Similarly we have calculated the daily 
premium at which ADRs trade in US markets (using the daily INR – USD exchange 
rate). This daily premium (in %) is then used to derive monthly average for each ADR 
over the period January 2001 to December 2005.  
 
Exhibit IV a illustrates the higher relative liquidity in 2004 for a sample of 4 
ADRs, all of which have displayed high ADR premiums over a long period of time.  
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Exhibit IV a
ADR
Average monthly Amihud 
measure (ADR) / Average 
monthly Amihud measure 
(Underlying equity)
ICICI Bank 2.89                                       
Infosys 2.29                                       
Wipro 9.83                                       
Reliance Industries 112.29                                    
This indicates that ADRs in the US markets display a higher liquidity relative to 
the underlying equity in the Indian markets. As mentioned above, liquidity carries a 
premium and ADRs may be valued more by investors who prefer liquidity. Given this, 
we explore to what extent does liquidity play a part in the existence of ADR premiums. 
 
We have, therefore, related the Monthly Amihud measure differential (an estimate 
of liquidity) to the premiums at which ADRs trade in the US markets. 
 
Therefore, we have derived a regression equation for the data for all ADRs (11 in 
number) by a bunching together the monthly Amihud measure differentials and monthly 
ADR premiums. The results are presented below 
 
Regression Analysis: ADR premium versus AM differential  
 
The regression equation is 
 
ADR pre = 0.186 + 0.000097 AM differential 
 
 
Predictor              Coef     SE Coef      T      P 
Constant           0.185659    0.007771  23.89  0.000 
AM differential  0.00009670  0.00006186   1.56  0.119 
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S = 0.175124   R-Sq = 0.4%   R-Sq(adj) = 0.2% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source           DF        SS       MS     F      P 
Regression        1   0.07494  0.07494  2.44  0.119 
Residual Error  578  17.72641  0.03067 
Total           579  17.80135 
 
We observe that the T- value is only 1.56 and the P-value is high at 11.9%. Also 
the R-sq is only 0.4%. Although it is well proven that liquidity commands a premium, in 
case of Indian ADRs it appears that the impact of liquidity difference between the ADRs 
and underlying equity is not a good predictor for the ADR premium. In other words, the 
results of the above regression are not statistically significant. 
 
We have also attempted similar regressions for individual ADRs viz. WIT, INFY 
and IBN. The results are not materially different from those obtained by using the 
aggregated data. 
 
A summary of results is presented Exhibit IV b (refer Appendix II for details) 
 
We also present in Exhibit IV c & d, scatter plots of the log of differential 
between the Amihud measures of ADRs and underlying equity versus the ADR 
premiums for two Indian ADRs, Infosys and Wipro. We plot the monthly data for the 
period January 2001 to December 2005. As the plots show, it is difficult to say 
conclusively that there exists a significant relationship between the illiquidity measure 
and ADR premiums. 
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Exhibit IV b
Company T-stat P-value R-sq.
Wipro 2.87 0.60% 12.40%
Infosys 0.20     
  
84.40% 0.10%
ICICI Bank 1.68 9.80% 4.70%  
Exhibit IV c
Log of Amihud Differential vs ADR premiums (INFOSYS)
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Exhibit IV d
Log of Amihud Differential vs ADR premium (Wipro)
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The above analyses lead us to conclude that liquidity is not an important factor for 
predicting the premiums of ADRs prices over the prices of underlying equity. 
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Currency Risk 
Exhibit IV e
Indian Rupee Depreciation
Year  versus USD versus GBP USD vs GBP
1996 2.1% 12.1% -8.9%
1997 9.3% 6.1% 3.0%
1998 8.2% 8.8% -0.5%
1999 2.4% -0.2% 2.6%
2000 7.3% -0.9% 8.3%
2001 3.5% 0.6% 2.9%
2002 -0.6% 9.9% -9.5%
2003 -5.1% 5.2% -9.8%
2004 -4.1% 3.9% -7.7%
2005 3.4% -7.7% 11.9%
Average 2.6% 3.8% -0.8%
Median 2.9% 4.5% 1.0%
High 9.3% 12.1% 11.9%
Low -5.1% -7.7% -9.8%
Data Source: Yahoo.co.in, www.oanda.com  
In case arbitrage is possible, any individual / corporate / institutional investor can 
invest in India freely through a sub-account with an FII, and convert it into ADR, rather 
than invest directly in a higher-priced, same-risk ADR. Any premium that exists may be 
partially due to Currency risk premium. In other words, the ADRs eliminate expected 
losses to investors due to depreciation of Indian Rupee (INR) versus USD (US Dollar). 
ADRs may trade at a premium because of this fact. 
 
Since Indian Rupee has been traditionally weak versus USD, the currency 
depreciation will partially explain higher ADR prices. Currency risk is primarily the 
expected depreciation in the Indian Rupee over and above the depreciation expected due 
to interest rate differentials. This currency risk premium should partially account for 
ADR premiums. Again, over the last 4 years, the dollar has depreciated versus rupee, not 
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entirely due to the relative strengths of US and Indian economies but primarily because of 
general weakening of USD. We, therefore, examine the currency movements of Indian 
rupee (INR) versus USD, INR versus GBP, and Euro versus INR, over last 10 years, to 
gauge “general” rupee depreciation (and hence the currency risk).  
 
Since the USD itself has depreciated on an average 0.8% versus GBP, INR 
depreciation versus GBP is a better indicator of average depreciation. Therefore, the 
actual currency risk (i.e. average depreciation expected, based on past currency 
movements) for INR is 3.8% per annum (refer Exhibit IV e). We, of course, assume here 
that (1) the average investment horizon (or holding period) for investors is 1 year, and (2) 
the currency movements of past 10 years form an appropriate basis for investor 
expectations about future currency depreciation and average depreciation of INR in the 
past is a good proxy for expected depreciation in future. 
 
Given the above, if average depreciation expected for INR is approximately 4%, 
the currency risk explains only a small portion of ADR premium. It may be mentioned 
here that ADR premium on Indian ADRs average 17% over last 5 years, which implies 
that only a small proportion of ADR premium is explained by currency risk premium. 
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Cost for transactions / procedural hassles 
 
Cost of procedural hassles is more of a subjective issue and is difficult to assign a 
value to such a variable. In any case, the cost of any procedural hassle cannot be as high 
as premiums of 17% for any rational investor. In other words, it seems unlikely that high 
ADR premiums for Indian securities can be ascribed to procedural hassles. It is important 
to note that procedural hassle is same for all securities, whereas ADR premiums vary 
greatly for different ADRs and are negative for some of them (e.g. Dr Reddy’s (RDY) 
and Tata Motors (TTM)). 
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Segmented Markets / Market Inefficiency 
 
 As we have mentioned earlier, ADRs are a pure derivative of the underlying 
equity with exactly similar cash flow and dividend rights. In other words, the risk-return 
characteristics of ADRs and underlying equity are same. Given this fact, if the prices of 
the ADR and the underlying equity still differ, it may be attributed to difference in 
investor preferences i.e. a market irrationality. In this context regard, we would like to 
mention the three comparable cases in contemporary finance that we touched upon in 
Section I (Introduction) – 
• Royal Dutch/ Shell group conundrum – From 1907 till June 2005, Royal Dutch 
Shell group was a joint venture between Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (RDP) of the 
Netherlands and the Shell Transport and Trading Company plc (STT) of UK in the ratio 
60:40. These two companies jointly owned all the operating companies in the group (and 
nothing else i.e. no other assets) and all earnings was always divided 60/40 in favor of 
Royal Dutch. However, the market prices of RDP and STT were never in the ratio of 
60:40, even though both companies had claim to exactly the same cash flows (in 60:40 
ratio), with similar risk-return characteristics. The difference in dividend policies of RDP 
and STT has been put forward as a possible reason for difference in share prices of RDP 
and STT (after adjusting for shareholding ratio in JV). However, a crucial difference here 
is that, in the case of ADRs, the dividend cash flows for ADRs and the underlying equity 
are exactly equal.  
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Exhibit IV f 
 
• The Closed End Mutual Fund puzzle – Closed end funds trade at a discount to 
their NAVs. This is a puzzle, since prima facie there is no reason why the market price 
for a closed-end fund should be different from the current value of the portfolio held by 
the fund, or its net asset value (NAV). In this regard, we analyze the closed end India 
Fund (IFN), and its price versus NAV.  Exhibit IV f shows that the India Fund has been 
trading at a discount for most of the last 10 years till mid-2005. Interestingly, the trend 
has reversed (i.e. Share Price has become greater than NAV) in the last 12 months. 
Again, the closed end IFN is a derivative of all the Indian equities that it holds in the 
Indian Stock market, so it seems irrational that the share price of IFN should be any 
different from its NAV (i.e. share prices of underlying equities). It should be mentioned 
here that the beta of IFN with S&P 500 is 1.59 versus a beta of 0.98 with the Bombay 
Sensex, which is interesting, given the fact that IFN consists of equities traded 
exclusively in the Indian stock market. However, it should be mentioned here, that, in the 
context of this paper, it is much more difficult to conduct an arbitrage between a closed 
end fund (i.e. IFN) traded in the US and the underlying equities traded in India. 
 114
• 3Com/Palm case – On September 13, 1999 3Com announced its intentions to take 
one of its subsidiaries, Palm Computing (a leading manufacturer of handheld devices), 
public the following year. On March 2, 2000 Palm became publicly traded on the Nasdaq 
National Market. 3Com sold a 6% stake at $38 a share which was well above the initial 
$14 to $16 range. At the time of the IPO, 3Com announced its intention to divest its 
remaining 94% ownership to 3Com shareholders within six months. On the first day of 
trading, Palm opened at $145, reaching a high of $165 before ending the day at $95.06. 
This stock price translated to a $53.4 billion value for Palm in contrast to 3Com’s $28.5 
billion value. Based on 3Com’s 94% ownership, 3Com’s stake in Palm was worth 
approximately $50 billion, giving substantial negative value to 3Com’s other assets, an 
almost perfect violation of the law of one price. 1  
 
A possible explanation for this anomaly has been the restrictions on arbitrage i.e. 
short selling Palm (and going long 3Com), due to a very small number of Palm shares 
available in the market. This effectively made arbitrage very difficult. In context of this 
paper, it is worth stating that although Palm was a part of 3Com but did not share the 
risk-return characteristics of 3Com in entirety (unlike ADR-underlying equity 
combination) 
 
Further, since 3Com had announced its intention to divest Palm completely within 
six months, the arbitrage had to necessarily go away at the time of divestment i.e. 3Com 
                                                 
1 “The Valuation and Market Rationality of Internet Stock Prices” – Ofek & Richardson, 2001 
“The Parent Company Puzzle – When is the whole less than one of its parts?” – Cornell & Liu, 2000 
 115
and Palm share prices (adjusted for share exchange ratio) had to converge. In contrast, in 
case of ADRs, there is no event (like divestment / merger) that would necessarily cause 
the prices of the underlying and the ADR to converge. 
 
In any case, the three cases above do provide though provoking examples of 
market inefficiencies, where securities with similar risk-return characteristics were valued 
very differently by same / different investors. Continuing this line of thought, we propose 
that a possible reason for the continued existence of ADR premiums is the difference in 
perceptions of the investors in US markets versus the investors in Indian markets. 
Although difficult to substantiate, this implies that there is a distinct dichotomy in the 
way these two markets are behaving as regards ADR premiums. Given the fact that there 
are no information asymmetries (as regards ADRs) and capital flow restrictions, it seems 
difficult that segmentation of markets may be a possible cause of ADR premiums. 
However, as we discussed in Section III, the absence of sufficient “headroom” is causing 
significant barriers to arbitrage and a veritable impediment to free flow of capital i.e. a 
segmentation of US and Indian stock markets. In the absence of sufficient “headroom”, 
arbitrage between the higher ADR prices and lower underlying equity prices seems quite 
difficult, which has allowed the ADR premiums (i.e. a market inefficiency) to persist for 
a long time. The magnitude of ADR premiums and the high correlations of certain ADRs 
(with relatively higher premiums) to S&P 500 seem to indicate the difference in investor 
expectations in US and India as a possible cause of ADR premiums. 
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V  EPILOGUE 
Current Data 
February 1 (Bloomberg) -- The following table of American and global depositary receipts of
Indian companies compares their closing prices with the most recent closes in local
trading. Price adjustments are based on a currency value of 44.12 rupee per dollar, along
with the number of shares per ADR or GDR. 
 
*T 
                     ADR/GDR                  Local     Local  ADR/GDR  Shares/ 
Company              Ticker  Close  % Chg    Equiv.     Close   % Prem   ADR/GDR 
Dr Reddy's           RDY     25.60  +0.24  1,129.42  1,119.60    +0.88       1.0  
HDFC Bank            HDB     59.44  +4.56    874.12    762.55   +14.63       3.0 
ICICI Bank           IBN     31.42  +0.03    693.09    609.15   +13.78       2.0 
Infosys Technologies INFY    76.22  +1.09  3,362.67  2,879.70   +16.77       1.0 
MTNL                 MTE      7.36  -0.68    162.35    141.70   +14.58       2.0 
Ranbaxy Labs         RBXD     9.23  +0.87    407.21    399.10    +2.03       1.0 
Reliance Industries  RIGD    33.50  +0.66    738.98    713.70    +3.54       2.0 
Satyam Computers     SAY     39.20  -0.73    864.71    746.65   +15.81       2.0 
State Bank of India  SBID    46.17  -3.41  1,018.46    886.80   +14.85       2.0 
Tata Motors          TTM     16.06  +2.23    708.54    709.30    -0.11       1.0 
Wipro                WIT     14.85  +1.23    655.15    529.90   +23.64       1.0 
 
The ADR premiums have declined further since July 2005 (when we initiated the 
research). For Infosys itself the premium is down from 39% to 16.7% currently. Given 
the fact that INFY ADR premium has been, on an average 50% in last 5 years, and was as 
high as 39% in July 2005, a decline of 23% is phenomenal indeed. Other ADRs that have 
experienced similar trend (though not as spectacular) are RIGD (average - 37%, current – 
4%), SAY (average - 23%, current – 16%) and SBID (average - 22%, current – 15%). 
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The average ADR premium is down to 11% now, which is a significant decline. 
Even though real arbitrage seems difficult in case of Indian ADRs, it is possible for 
investors to short the ADRs in US, go long the Indian equity and invest the difference in 
risk-free securities. Since the correlation between ADRs and underlying equity is over 
90%, the equity risk is somewhat hedged in such a transaction (even though the beta of 
ADR for underlying equity is 0.56). Also, ADR premium should more than compensate 
investors for the hedging cost of currency risk. The balance amount is, of course, “quasi” 
- arbitrage profit. Of course, such a transaction is predicated on the investors receiving 
the proceeds of short sale and borrowing costs (of ADRs short sold) being minimal. 
 
Summary  
 
We summarize the results of our analyses with the following observations. 
 
Premiums on ADRs of Indian companies have been in existence for some time 
(around 5 years, starting 1999 till date), and the phenomenon is unique to Indian ADRs, 
vis-à-vis ADRs from other countries.  Although, the ADR premiums have been trending 
down for some time lately, the average premium was still around 16% in 2005. The 
ADRs returns appear to be more sensitive to US stock markets, than the Indian stock 
markets and the underlying equity. More interestingly, the ADR prices do not move in 
lock-step with the prices of underlying equity, despite sharing exactly the same risk-
return characteristics.  
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Certain institutional framework issues (viz. insufficient “headroom”) have had a 
substantial impact on the existence ADR premiums, in that these issues make it difficult 
for investors to take advantage of ADR premiums via arbitrage. Our research indicates 
that the impact of liquidity and currency risk premium on ADR premiums is relatively 
insignificant. A possible reason (though not conclusive) for such premiums does appear 
to be segmented markets, which does indicate market inefficiency, to a degree. In this 
context, we compare the phenomenon of ADR premiums to the Royal Dutch / Shell share 
prices, the Closed End fund puzzle, and the 3Com-Palm case. In all the three cases, 
securities with similar risk-return characteristics were valued differently by investors. 
 
Further, the fact that ADR premiums are declining can have the following 
possible analyses: 
 
(1) Arbitrageurs have been able to effect quasi-arbitrage, which enables them to 
circumvent the barriers to arbitrage in institutional framework (described in Section 
III), and /or 
 
(2) The market inefficiency is being corrected gradually, or the segmented market 
hypothesis is being eliminated as investor expectation finally converge in US and 
Indian markets. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Description1 India Hong Kong2 Germany South Korea 
Portfolio 
Investment 
Foreign institutional 
investors (FIIs) may invest 
directly in all securities 
traded on the primary and 
secondary markets in India, 
subject to certain caps 
No specific restrictions 
apply to portfolio 
investment, and foreign 
investors may place funds 
directly in the stock and 
bond markets. 
No obstacles exist to 
raising and moving capital 
in Germany. 
Markets totally 
liberalized since 1997 
crises. Even unlisted 
stocks and derivatives 
available for unlimited 
foreign investment. No 
individual or aggregate 
ceilings exist. 
                                                 
1 Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist 
2 The underlying stock for ADRs of Chinese shares on the US stock exchanges are the shares of Chinese companies listed on Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (called ‘H’ shares). These shares have been issued primarily for foreign investors, trade at a lower PE compared to shares listed on the 
Chinese Stock Exchanges (called ‘A’ & ‘B’ shares) and are subject to securities markets rules of Hong Kong. 
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Repatriation of 
Capital 
Repatriation of portfolio 
investments is permitted on 
the same terms to all 
classes of non-resident 
investors. Under the 
Foreign Exchange 
Management Act, for 
portfolio investments made 
in secondary markets, 
repatriation of capital is 
allowed freely.  
 
No restriction on the 
amount of local currency or 
foreign currency that can 
be brought into or taken out 
of Hong Kong. 
No restrictions or special 
regulations apply. 
Free repatriation of 
approved capital is 
guaranteed by law. Ex 
post facto reporting 
rules apply. Legitimacy 
of origins must be 
confirmed by remitting 
forex bank. 
Repatriation of 
Profits/ Dividends 
All foreign banks, 
companies and project 
offices can remit profits 
and dividends without 
permission from the 
Reserve Bank of India. 
No restrictions on payment 
of dividends or other 
distributions to overseas or 
foreign shareholders. 
No restrictions or special 
regulations apply. 
Same as repatriation of 
capital. New legislation 
makes it for foreign 
funds difficult to avoid 
tax on capital gains. 
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ADR provisions No approval required from 
Government for fresh ADR 
issue; only intimation 
within 30 days is required. 
Only limited fungibility of 
ADRs is allowed. 
No restrictions are imposed 
on listed companies’ 
issuance of GDRs or 
ADRs. 
There is no government-
imposed cap on GDR or 
ADR issuance. 
Listed firms have been 
allowed to issue 
overseas securities in 
unlimited amounts 
since 1998. No special 
restrictions 
* We include ADRs of Chinese shares listed on Hong Stock Exchange in our dataset. Therefore, we have analyzed the institutional framework in 
Hong Kong (and not China) in this report.
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India1 
 
Portfolio Investment 
 
FIIs include pension funds, mutual funds, investment trusts, insurance or re-
insurance companies, asset-management companies, incorporated institutional portfolio 
managers, university funds, endowments, foundations and charitable trusts/societies with a 
track record. Secondary stock market operations are permitted only through registered 
intermediaries on the Indian stock exchanges. FIIs are permitted to lend their securities 
through an approved intermediary.  
 
Portfolio investments are subject to an aggregate ceiling of 24% of paid-up equity 
capital in one company for registered FIIs and sub-accounts, with a sub-ceiling of 10% for 
any one FII. Indian companies can increase this 24% limit up to the FDI cap in the relevant 
sector, provided the company’s board of directors approves the move and the general body 
of the corporation passes a resolution allowing it. Investments by FIIs through offshore 
single/regional funds, Global Depositary Receipts, American Depositary Receipts and 
euro-convertibles are not counted towards FII limits. 
 
                                                 
1 Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist 
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FIIs that are asset-management companies, investment advisers, nominee 
companies, institutional portfolio managers, trustees, power-of-attorney holders or banks 
may invest on behalf of sub-accounts. A sub-account can be a foreign company or 
individual, an institution, fund or portfolio established outside India. In the case of a fund 
or portfolio, it must be “broad-based”, meaning that it should have at least 20 investors, 
with no single individual investor holding more than 10% of its shares or units. The 
registration process for sub-accounts is simpler: FIIs need only submit details of sub-
accounts, an undertaking and a registration fee of US$1,000. The SEBI registers them 
within three working days. 
 
Repatriation of capital 
 
Repatriation of capital is permitted for any class of foreign investor, including non-
resident Indians (NRIs) and foreign institutional investors (FIIs), if the original capital was 
remitted from abroad in foreign currency and if the equity has been sold on a stock 
exchange.  
 
This therefore excludes investments in partnerships, which are not listed. However, 
NRIs can invest in partnership firms on a repatriation basis with government approval. 
Repatriation of portfolio investments is permitted on the same terms to all classes of non-
resident investors. Under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, for portfolio investments 
made in secondary markets, repatriation of capital is allowed freely.  
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ADR provisions 
 
From 2000 onwards, companies no longer require approval from the Ministry of 
Finance for overseas issues, but should inform both the ministry and the exchange-control 
department of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) within 30 days of the issue. This rule 
applies to companies issuing ADRs/GDRs for the first time and those issuing a fresh set of 
ADRs/GDRs, provided that they issue new equity shares to support the offering and 
expand their capital bases. This automatic route also applies to the issue of employee stock 
options in the form of ADRs/GDRs by Indian software and other IT companies. 
 
In February 2002 the RBI permitted limited two-way fungibility of ADRs/GDRs, 
meaning that ADRs or GDRs that have been converted into local shares can be converted 
back into ADRs or GDRs. This applies only to re-conversions. In November 2002 the RBI 
allowed Indian companies to sponsor ADR/GDR issues with overseas depositories against 
the shares held by their shareholders. In February 2003 it further said that resident 
shareholders that offer their shares for such conversions could receive the proceeds in 
foreign currency. 
 
As per limited fungibility, any broker can convert shares to ADR but only to the 
extent of past conversion of ADRs in that company into shares. This is called ‘Headroom’. 
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So up to the point that headroom is not fully utilized, anybody can buy in local market and 
convert to ADR and pocket the profit.  
 
The other way to convert local shares to ADRs is very cumbersome and time 
consuming. This also requires regulatory permission. Also, the company has to pass a 
special resolution and appoint a merchant banker and make sure that an opportunity is 
given to all the shareholders to participate in this process.  
Hong Kong1 
 
Hong Kong, subject to Chinese sovereignty but not its legal jurisdiction, has been 
good source of funds for companies in mainland China. More than 150 mainland 
companies were listed there in July 2005. The China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) must examine and approve companies that intend to issue Hong Kong–listed H-
shares. Furthermore, they need to bring their articles of association and their activities into 
conformance with the provisions of the Company Law, in addition to the necessary clauses 
for the articles of association of companies to be listed in Hong Kong. 
 
ADR provisions 
 
                                                 
1 Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist 
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As per regulations, the depositary banks can create ADRs if investor(s) deliver H 
shares along with payment of applicable issuance fees/ taxes/ other charges. Additionally, 
investors are entitled to present ADRs to depositary bank for cancellation and then receive 
corresponding number of underlying shares, on payment of applicable cancellation fees/ 
taxes/ other charges. 
Germany1 
 
Portfolio Investments 
 
Foreign corporations and non-residents are free to acquire securities of any 
maturity. These include German stocks, bonds, money-market instruments or any other 
portfolio instruments. There is substantial liquidity in government bonds, Pfandbriefe 
(asset-backed, particularly mortgage bonds), and blue-chip stocks, and a growing interest in 
corporate bonds, too. 
 
South Korea2 
 
Portfolio investment 
 
                                                 
1 Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist 
2 Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist 
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Foreign portfolio investment is governed by the Foreign Exchange Transaction Act 
and the Securities and Exchange Act. Foreign portfolio investment began with the opening 
of the country’s equity market in 1992. Bonds and money-market instruments were off 
limits to foreign investors until late 1997. The closed markets were due to apprehensions 
regarding the large gap between prevailing international and domestic interest rates (once 
more than 5 percentage points above US Treasuries) which could have caused a flood of 
“hot” money. 
The financial crisis of 1997 completely changed the scenario and during 1998–99, 
foreign portfolio investment in local stocks, bonds and money-market instruments was 
almost completely liberalized, as follows: 
• Since December 1997 foreign investors have been allowed to invest in listed public and 
corporate bonds without restrictions. 
• Since May 1998 the money market has been completely opened up to foreign investment, 
with certificates of deposit, repurchase agreements and other instruments freely traded for 
foreign investors’ accounts. (Commercial paper and trade bills became available in 
February 1998.) 
• Since May 1998 foreign investment in stocks listed on the Korea Stock Exchange and the 
Kosdaq market (both of which are now part of the Korea Exchange) has been fully 
liberalized, with no individual or aggregate ceilings. Futures and options are also freely 
available, and foreigners can also subscribe to rights issues. 
• In July 1999 unlisted stocks and bonds became available for unlimited foreign investment. 
 128
Foreign portfolio investors can also invest in stock or bond investment trusts and 
mutual funds. A purchase of a stake of less than 10% in a South Korean company by a non-
resident investor must be reported to a relevant forex bank. If it involves a stock swap 
(listed stocks only), then the Bank of Korea must be notified. 
Repatriation of capital 
Free repatriation of approved capital is guaranteed by law. No restrictions or 
requirements exist for reinvestment of profits. However, the forex bank that transfers 
repatriated capital must confirm the legitimacy of its origins. All remittances must be made 
from the same account at a designated forex bank, a rule that also applies to personal 
remittances. Ex post facto reporting rules set by the Foreign Exchange Transaction Act 
apply.  
Remittance of dividends and profits 
Free remittance of dividends and profits is guaranteed by law. However, forex banks 
conducting business with the foreign investors must verify the legitimacy of such 
remittances. Ex post facto reporting rules set by the Foreign Exchange Transaction Act 
apply. 
New legislation is making it more difficult for foreign funds—most notably US 
investment funds—operating from tax-haven outposts around the world to take profits out 
of South Korea in tax-free dollars under the conventional protection of bilateral tax treaties. 
A new special provision written into the existing Law for the Co-ordination of International 
Tax Affairs allows the National Tax Service (NTS) to levy local withholding taxes on 
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dividends, interest, and capital gains collected by foreign funds registered in some tax-
haven jurisdictions, irrespective of any bilateral tax treaties that permit tax-free repatriation 
of profits. The measure, included in South Korea's annual tax-reform package effective in 
January 2006, should affect the operations of private-equity funds and other investment 
funds doing business in South Korea.  
GDRs/ADRs provisions 
Global Depositary Receipts (GDRs) and American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) are 
available and are a popular source of overseas funds for South Korean firms. GDRs/ADRs 
issued by blue-chip companies such as POSCO, Korea Electric Power, Samsung 
Electronics, Hyundai Motor and KB (Kookmin Bank) are traded on exchanges in New 
York, London and Luxembourg.  
Listed firms have been allowed to issue overseas securities in unlimited amounts 
since 1998, and practically all remaining restrictions on GDR/ADR issues (such as 
minimum dividend pay-outs) disappeared in that year. Companies seeking to issue 
GDRs/ADRs based on their own shares bought back from shareholders can do so 
immediately after they complete the buyback program. GDRs/ADRs can be issued in 
private placements. Since 2001, companies have been able to offer GDRs/ADRs at a 
discount larger than the official limit of 30%, with approval from the Financial Supervisory 
Commission. 
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APPENDIX II 
 
Regression Analysis: Wip D (ADR premium)  versus Wip A (Amihud measure 
differential) 
 
The regression equation is 
Wip D = 0.184 - 0.000555 Wip A 
 
 
Predictor        Coef    SE Coef      T      P 
Constant      0.18441    0.01984   9.29  0.000 
Wip A      -0.0005547  0.0001934  -2.87  0.006 
 
 
S = 0.142236   R-Sq = 12.4%   R-Sq(adj) = 10.9% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF       SS       MS     F      P 
Regression       1  0.16641  0.16641  8.23  0.006 
Residual Error  58  1.17341  0.02023 
Total           59  1.33982 
 
 
Unusual Observations 
 
Obs  Wip A    Wip D      Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
  7    506  -0.0200  -0.0965  0.0923    0.0765      0.71 X 
  8    317   0.0200   0.0083  0.0569    0.0117      0.09 X 
 10    450   0.0200  -0.0650  0.0815    0.0850      0.73 X 
 46      0   0.5100   0.1843  0.0198    0.3257      2.31R 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large 
influence. 
 
  
Regression Analysis: Infy D (ADR premium) versus Infy A (Amihud measure 
differential) 
 
The regression equation is 
Infy D = 0.498 - 0.000012 Infy A 
 
 
Predictor         Coef     SE Coef      T      P 
Constant       0.49758     0.01578  31.53  0.000 
Infy A     -0.00001216  0.00006152  -0.20  0.844 
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S = 0.120107   R-Sq = 0.1%   R-Sq(adj) = 0.0% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF       SS       MS     F      P 
Regression       1  0.00056  0.00056  0.04  0.844 
Residual Error  58  0.83670  0.01443 
Total           59  0.83726 
 
 
Unusual Observations 
 
Obs  Infy A  Infy D     Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
 23      29  0.7600  0.4972  0.0155    0.2628      2.21R 
 25    1977  0.4400  0.4735  0.1197   -0.0335     -3.38RX 
 58      -0  0.2300  0.4976  0.0158   -0.2676     -2.25R 
 59       0  0.2400  0.4976  0.0158   -0.2576     -2.16R 
 60       0  0.2200  0.4976  0.0158   -0.2776     -2.33R 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large 
influence. 
 
  
Regression Analysis: IBN d (ADR premium) versus IBN A (Amihud measure 
differential) 
 
The regression equation is 
IBN d = 0.123 - 0.000280 IBN A 
 
 
Predictor        Coef    SE Coef      T      P 
Constant      0.12327    0.01044  11.81  0.000 
IBN A      -0.0002799  0.0001663  -1.68  0.098 
 
 
S = 0.0758329   R-Sq = 4.7%   R-Sq(adj) = 3.0% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF        SS        MS     F      P 
Regression       1  0.016282  0.016282  2.83  0.098 
Residual Error  58  0.333537  0.005751 
Total           59  0.349818 
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Unusual Observations 
 
Obs  IBN A     IBN d      Fit   SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
  4      7  -0.04000  0.12135  0.01010  -0.16135     -2.15R 
  6    177  -0.03000  0.07369  0.02763  -0.10369     -1.47 X 
  7     -0  -0.04000  0.12337  0.01046  -0.16337     -2.18R 
  9     13  -0.05000  0.11975  0.00991  -0.16975     -2.26R 
 21    413   0.05000  0.00763  0.06583   0.04237      1.13 X 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large 
influence. 
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APPENDIX III 
 
Trend Analysis of ADR premiums over 2001-2005 
 
Dr Reddy’s Laboratories (RDY) 
 
Month
R
dy
SepMarSepMarSepMarSepMarSepMar
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 597.593
MAD 0.026
MSD 0.002
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Rdy
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = 0.0696966 - 0.00317328*t + 0.0000433591*t**2
 
 
 
 
HDFC Bank (HDB) 
 
Month
H
db
MarSepMarSepMarSepMarSepMar
0.35
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 103.155
MAD 0.046
MSD 0.004
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Hdb
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = -0.0155686 + 0.0111006*t - 0.000164012*t**2
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MTNL (MTE) 
 
Month
M
te
MarSepMarSepMarSepMarSepMar
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 415.946
MAD 0.058
MSD 0.004
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Mte
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = -0.00682200 + 0.00291155*t + 0.0000244050*t**2
 
 
Reliance Industries (RIGD) 
 
Month
R
ig
d
SepMarSepMarSepMarSepMarSepMar
0.60
0.55
0.50
0.45
0.40
0.35
0.30
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 12.6265
MAD 0.0484
MSD 0.0042
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Rigd
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = 0.341996 + 0.00454419*t - 0.0000876593*t**2
 
Ranbaxy Lab (RBXD) 
 
Month
R
bd
x
SepMarSepMarSepMarSepMarSepMar
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 95.9661
MAD 0.0210
MSD 0.0007
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Rbdx
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = 0.146430 - 0.00297914*t + 7.761780E-06*t**2
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SBI (SBID) 
 
Month
Sb
id
SepMarSepMarSepMarSepMarSepMar
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 41.3994
MAD 0.0673
MSD 0.0070
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Sbid
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = 0.0138131 + 0.0159891*t - 0.000220665*t**2
 
Wipro (WIT) 
 
Month
W
it
SepMarSepMarSepMarSepMarSepMar
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 372.573
MAD 0.078
MSD 0.009
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Wit
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = -0.0661807 + 0.00954301*t - 0.0000460656*t**2
 
 
Tata Motors (TTM) 
 
Month
Tt
m
MayMarJanNovSepJulMayMar
0.025
0.020
0.015
0.010
0.005
0.000
-0.005
-0.010
Accuracy Measures
MAPE 187.288
MAD 0.004
MSD 0.000
Variable
Actual
Fits
Trend Analysis Plot for Ttm
Quadratic Trend Model
Yt = 0.0239674 - 0.00521969*t + 0.000233497*t**2
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I. Introduction 
Individual investors and institutional shareholders have long attempted to influence the 
behavior of management in hopes of increasing equity returns.  In the past such efforts were 
typically limited to voting on specific governance procedures with little immediate or direct 
effect on the underlying business or composition of the management team.  In effect, early 
activist investors worked to ensure that the board of directors acted as an effective agent of the 
shareholders.1  This type of activism was essentially passive, limiting shareholders to voting on 
board proposals or campaigning for certain marginal corporate governance measures.  
Shareholder activism was partially restrained by Securities and Exchange Commission rules that 
limited shareholder access to the issuer-funded proxy process.  In 1992, however, the SEC 
promulgated Rule 14a-8 giving shareholders easier access to company proxy materials.  This 
new rule and other factors led to an increase in shareholder activism in the proxy process and 
through informal negotiations with management.2 
Despite this increase in shareholder activism over the past decade, studies suggest activist 
shareholders have had little impact on stock returns.3  These studies find no systematic effect of 
activist shareholder campaigns since the passage of Rule 14a-8.  Authors suggest individual and 
institutional investors fail to effect shareholder returns because they are either too small, in the 
case of individual investors, or unable to trade their positions, in the case of institutional 
investors (Gillian and Starks (1996)). 
                                                 
1 Stuart L. Gillian and Laura T. Starks, Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism:  the role of 
institutional investors, 57 Journal of Financial Economics 275 (1996). 
2 Georgeson Shareholder Annual Corporate Governance Review, (2005). 
3 S. Wahl Pension Fund Activism and Firm Performance, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 31 
(1996). 
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Recently, a new type of investor has become more involved:  professional money 
managers operating as activist investors, notably hedge funds.  With abundant capital to invest, 
hedge funds have purchased non-controlling positions in companies and pushed management for 
corporate actions that, these investors argue, increase shareholder returns.  These modern activist 
investors typically seek to win board seats or to convince management to take specific action 
such as selling non-core businesses or returning more cash to shareholders.  These activist 
campaigns are carried out either through formal proxy contests or private negotiations with 
management that are disclosed to the public through SEC filings or the business press. 
Although professional investors have long engaged in battles for corporate control, recent 
efforts represent a shift in strategy.  Specifically, in the past professional investors often sought 
to purchase a company outright and take action to change the management and operations in 
order to unlock value.  In a corporate buy-out the professional investor has unfettered power to 
make corporate changes and capture most of the increase in value, less any premium paid during 
the buy-out.  Today, many professional investors do not seek full ownership, or even effective 
control, but rather purchase a block of shares to gain a voice with management and benefit from 
increases in share returns.  Using this strategy professional investors purchase or control a 
minority position, that is typically less than 20%, thereby risking less capital but allowing them 
to exercise greater influence over corporate affairs than their share ownership would suggest.4 
This paper examines activist investor campaigns and attempts to measure whether their 
efforts increase shareholder value.   
                                                 
4 While activist investors may hold less than 20% in a company to limit their risk, an additional explanation for the 
small ownership percentage is the investor’s need to remain below ownership levels that would trigger a poison pill 
(often less than 20% ownership will trigger a poison pill). 
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II.   Background on Proxy Contests 
A common vehicle for activist campaigns is the annual or special shareholder meeting 
proxy solicitation process.  Proxy contests require specific public filings with the SEC that 
inform the public of the activist investor’s efforts.  As an initial matter, any person or group of 
persons who acquires 5% or more of the shares of a reporting company must file a Schedule 13D 
or Schedule 13G with the SEC to report the holdings.  Both schedules must be updated following 
additional purchases or sales of the securities and include disclosure of the investor’s identity, 
percentage of shares held and any intent to influence management or seek control of the 
company.  If a shareholder pursues a formal proxy contest, the shareholder is required to file 
preliminary and definitive proxy materials providing specific information on the investor’s 
proposals.  These documents give public notice of the progress of the proxy contest enabling 
investors to vote in support of the activist investor or incumbent management. 
III. Prior Research 
Existing research on shareholder proposals does not focus on hedge funds, most likely 
because professional activist investing has become a major factor in the market only recently as 
investment funds have more capital to invest and stock market returns have moderated as 
compared to the 1990s.  Past research has instead focused on shareholder proposals that were 
contained in company proxy materials and proposed simple corporate governance changes such 
as redeeming a poison pill or declassifying the board of directors.  Existing research also focuses 
on the effects of pension funds such as CalPERS and has drawn varying conclusion as to the 
effect of proxy contests.  For example, Gillian and Starks (1999), study the differences in support 
gained by shareholder proposals sponsored by individuals, groups and institutional investors 
finding that proposals offered by institutions garner more support than those offered by 
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individuals or investor groups.5  Similarly, Bradley, Brav, Goldstein and Jang (2005) find that 
the revised SEC rules from 1992, and more recently as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
have reduced the costs of the formal proxy contests and have, therefore, led to an increase in 
such contests.6 
While institutional shareholders may have more influence in a proxy contest than 
individual investors, Monks and Minnow (1995) find that pension funds and other similar 
institutions do not have broad based support from their beneficiaries to engage in aggressive 
activist investing.  They conclude that institutional investors can be an important constituency for 
individual investors to work with when pushing for significant corporate or management 
change.7  Summing up existing research, Karpoff (2001) concludes that studies disagree on the 
effect of activist campaigns mostly because there are differences in the samples selection as well 
as definitions of a successful campaign.8 
This paper will measure the effect of professional activist investors, as defined below, on 
shareholder returns in recent activist campaigns.  Activist investors claim that their interests are 
aligned with other shareholders thus we should expect that, with their outsized influence over 
management, they will increase returns for all shareholders.  This paper will then attempt to 
define financial characteristics of companies that make it more likely that an activist campaign 
will yield positive excess returns. 
                                                 
5 Gillian and Starks, Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional Investors:  a 
Global Perspective, University of Delaware Working Paper. 
6 Michael Bradley, Alon Brav, Itay Goldstein and Wei Jang, Costly Communication, Shareholder Activism and the 
Limits of Arbitrage, (2005). 
7 Robert Monks and Nell Minnow, Corporate Governance, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Blackwell. 
8 Jonathan M. Karpoff, The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Companies:  A Survey of Empirical Findings, Emory 
University (2001).  
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IV. Data Sample 
In this study a critical question is the definition of an activist investor.  In this analysis, 
activist investors were defined as professional investors who are not corporate insiders and are 
seeking to initiate significant corporate actions to improve their investment returns (e.g., election 
of directors and pursuing a sale of the company).  In addition to excluding corporate insiders 
such as existing board members, the definition of activist investor excludes investors who have 
been shareholders for an extended period of time and are blocking an action proposed by the 
company such as a merger.  The definition of activist investors does, however, include investors 
who have purchased shares in a company after management has proposed a merger or other 
significant action.9  The logic behind this definition is to examine cases where professional 
investors make an investment in a company and work to make changes that would not have 
occurred in the absence of the investor.   
The key period for measuring excess returns in the sample was the announcement of the 
initiation of a campaign and the ultimate resolution of the activist campaign.  When an activist 
pursues a formal proxy challenge there are a series of public filings required which are often 
accompanied by press releases and independent press coverage.  In cases where there is no 
formal proxy contest, an activist who owns more than 5% of the shares must file a Schedule 13D 
disclosing their ownership stake as well as their intentions to advocate for changes with 
management.  All dates for the sample were based on the first public announcement of either the 
initiation or completion of an activist campaign through SEC filings or press coverage as 
available on Lexis-Nexis.   
                                                 
9 For example, this sample includes Carl Icahn’s investment in Mylan Laboratories following its announced 
acquisition King Pharmaceuticals where Mr. Icahn made his investment and then attempted to block the proposed 
acquisition. 
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The sample time period for activist investor efforts was set from 2001 through 2005 with 
increasing emphasis in 2004 and 2005 in order to capture the characteristics of the recent 
increase in activist investor efforts.  The initial screen for relevant activist efforts was the 
Georgeson Shareholder Annual Corporate Governance Review for each of the relevant years.  
During this time period there were approximately 200 contested proxy solicitations by 
shareholders (Georgeson 2005).  Proxy contests were screened to include only those initiated by 
activist investors, as defined above.  In addition to the Georgeson Shareholder Annual Corporate 
Governance Review reports, business and financial press reports included in Lexis-Nexis 
provided additional cases of activist efforts that were not formal proxy contests.  This screen 
reduced the overall size of the sample to about 75.  This sample was further reduced by those 
companies for which the CRSP database (maintained by the Center for Research in Security 
Prices) did not have excess return information.  The CRSP database contains excess returns for 
shares listed on NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq.  The limitation based on CRSP caused a 
disproportionate reduction in the number of activist efforts involving smaller companies which 
tend not to be covered by CRSP. 
In the final sample, events classified as successful campaigns exceeded those classified as 
failures (27 of 40 cases were classified as successes).  This potential bias in favor of successful 
campaigns is likely the result of the classification of settlements of proxy contests between the 
activist investor and management.  Cases that were settled before a proxy vote, in the case of a 
formal proxy contest, were classified as a success because in all observed cases of a settlement 
the activist investor achieved the major objective of the campaign. 
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V. Data Analysis 
The CRSP database computes excess returns for stocks traded on the major stock 
exchanges.  Stocks are categorized into deciles based on certain characteristics and excess 
returns are benchmarked against other companies in the relevant deciles.  CRSP uses deciles 
based on Beta, standard deviation of returns and market capitalization.  In this analysis the Beta 
deciles were the relevant benchmark to measure each company’s relative performance against 
other companies with similar exposure to market risk. 
The CRSP database provides Beta excess returns on a daily basis.  For the analysis, each 
daily excess return was converted into a continuously compounded rate using the natural 
logarithm.  The compounded excess returns were measured over a variety of event windows 
ranging from as much as 30 days before to 45 days after each announcement to as little as 2 days 
before and after each announcement.  This technique of examining differing time periods was 
designed to both capture the key excess return periods in the analysis and to determine if the 
market was able to discount rumors or other non-public predictors of announcements. 
VI. Event Study Results 
A.  Commencement 
Windows of -30 to +30 (the “61-day Period”) and -30 to +45 (the “76-day Period”) were 
used to measure cumulative excess returns following the public announcement of an activist 
investor’s commencement of a campaign to influence management and following the public 
announcement of the conclusion of the campaign.  Mean cumulative excess returns during the 
61-day Period surrounding commencement was +8.6% significant at 5% and the median excess 
return was 9.1%.  During the 76-day Period surrounding commencement the mean excess return 
fell to +6.4% with a t statistic of 1.22, while the median excess return was 9.6%.  While excess 
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returns during the 76-day Period were not necessarily significant in a strict sense, the trend is 
consistent with the 61-day Period.  Both time periods show that excess returns become positive 
in the period leading up to the first announcement and reach their apex approximately 13 trading 
days after the announcement.  These trends are shown in more detail in the graphs below for the 
76-day Period as well as for the period immediately surrounding the announcement. 
Cumulative Excess Returns - Commencement
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
-30 -27 -24 -21 -18 -15 -12 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45
Time
Ex
ce
ss
 R
et
ur
ns
 
 146
Commencement -2 to +10
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Time
Ex
ce
ss
 R
et
ur
ns
 
B. Conclusion 
At the conclusion of activist investor campaigns, the trend in cumulative excess returns is 
less clear.  The table below shows the mean, median and t statistic for cases of activist investor 
success, failure and all conclusions.   
Excess Returns - Conclusion
-30 to +30 -30 to +45
Mean Median t statistic Mean Median t statistic
Activist Success (0.058) (0.002) (1.18) (0.074) (0.055) (1.75)
Activist Failure 0.040 (0.003) 1.17 0.027 0.018 0.68
All Conclusions (0.025) (0.003) (0.73) (0.041) (0.053) (1.27)  
Excess returns during the period 76-day Period surrounding conclusion of a campaign are 
generally negative in the case of an activist investor’s success and slightly positive in the case of 
failure.  The trend in excess returns is shown in the graph below for the 76-day Period as well as 
for the period immediately surrounding the conclusion. 
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Cumulative Excess Returns - Conclusion
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Showing negative or zero excess returns at the conclusion of all campaigns appears to be 
inconsistent with the positive excess returns following the initiation of an activist campaign.  In 
addition, excess returns over the 76-day Period appear to be more negative in the cases where an 
activist is successful as compared to when an activist fails.  A plausible explanation for better 
returns in the case of a failed campaign is that when activist investors fail, they often continue to 
publicly pressure management and have the option to re-initiate a campaign.  The data also show 
that success by an activist investor leads to near zero excess returns in the period leading up to 
the conclusion, positive excess return when success is announced, followed by negative excess 
returns thereafter.  This may represent the market discounting the possibility of improved 
corporate performance or a potential sale of the company prior to the conclusion when it is 
apparent that the activist investor will prevail.  When the activist is ultimately successful, 
however, the activist may not be willing or able to implement all value enhancing proposals and 
the price premium may, therefore, be reduced. 
Cumulative excess returns at the commencement and conclusion of activist campaigns 
suggest that the market is able to discount the commencement of the campaign and predict 
whether the campaign will be successful.  In terms of the announcement, excess returns become 
positive in the trading days immediately preceding the public announcement which likely reflects 
rumors in the market of an imminent challenge to management.  Specifically, modern activist 
campaigns are often led by one activist investor but other hedge funds may formally join the 
effort, or take a position in the shares alongside the lead activist.10  This phenomenon could 
cause activist investors to begin taking a position in the shares before the formal announcement.  
Provided the investors own less than 5% of the shares there is no required disclosure of the 
                                                 
10 Dan Roberts and Stephen Schurr, Tyco Now Targeted by Activist Hedge Funds, Financial Times, February 27, 
2006. 
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ownership stake which would delay the public announcement of the campaign.  Similarly, as an 
activist investor purchases shares in preparation for a campaign, they have an incentive to begin 
publicizing their efforts to unlock shareholder value to begin gaining shareholder support for 
their campaign.  These efforts can often include assembling a group of other activist investors to 
purchase blocks of shares which would further boost returns prior to a public announcement.  All 
of these factors would contribute to the market anticipating the start of a contest.  In terms of the 
conclusion of the campaign, the market appears to be able to predict the outcome – with a low 
statistical significance.  The ability to predict the outcome is likely the result of the ongoing 
public nature of the campaign that is covered in the press, in SEC filings and often in other 
public announcements by third party corporate governance evaluators such as Institutional 
Shareholder Services. 
The table below displays the cumulative excess returns over a series of time periods in 
relation to the announcement date.  The mean and median points show that the data tend to be 
skewed because of several observations with very high excess returns.  The mean has, therefore, 
been supplemented with a p-value derived from a non-parametric test measuring positive or 
negative excess returns regardless of the size of the return and computed the probability of 
positive returns as .5.  The p-values displayed below show the probability that the number of 
observed announcements with positive returns would equal or exceed the number actual 
observed if the probability of positive returns was .5.  Both the analysis of the sample mean as 
well as the non-parametric test show positive excess returns surrounding the announcement date 
and positive excess returns in the period just before and immediately following conclusion of an 
activist campaign. 
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Cumulative Excess Returns in the Period Surrounding Announcement Date
Commencement Success Failure All Conclusions
Mean Median t stat p-value Mean Median t stat p-value Mean Median t stat p-value Mean Median t stat p-value
T + 2 0.015 0.006 1.14 0.04 0.018 0.012 1.94 0.00 0.008 0.006 0.58 0.13 0.014 0.008 1.93 0.00
+/- 2 0.024 0.012 1.60 0.00 0.009 0.016 0.77 0.04 (0.001) (0.003) (0.10) 0.50 0.005 0.008 0.61 0.10
T + 5 0.032 0.020 2.22 0.02 0.009 0.011 0.83 0.01 (0.006) (0.002) (0.43) 0.13 0.004 0.007 0.45 0.01
-2 - +5 0.040 0.039 2.35 0.00 (0.000) 0.009 (0.01) 0.08 (0.015) (0.001) (0.85) 0.29 (0.005) (0.001) (0.47) 0.10
+/- 5 0.050 0.055 2.02 0.00 0.011 0.008 0.76 0.28 (0.025) (0.028) (1.33) 0.87 (0.001) (0.005) (0.11) 0.63
T + 10 0.048 0.035 2.79 0.00 0.003 (0.002) 0.23 0.58 (0.015) (0.019) (0.86) 0.95 (0.003) (0.004) (0.26) 0.90
-2 - +10 0.057 0.065 2.73 0.00 (0.006) 0.003 (0.32) 0.42 (0.024) (0.029) (1.25) 0.87 (0.012) (0.005) (0.88) 0.74
+/- 10 0.075 0.081 2.15 0.00 (0.007) 0.013 (0.35) 0.28 (0.035) (0.050) (1.63) 0.95 (0.016) (0.021) (1.07) 0.74
T + 30 0.022 0.024 1.00 0.02 (0.056) (0.029) (1.77) 0.72 0.012 0.016 0.39 0.29 (0.033) (0.005) (1.41) 0.63
-2 - +30 0.031 0.064 1.23 0.08 (0.065) (0.011) (1.90) 0.72 0.003 0.062 0.09 0.13 (0.042) (0.005) (1.68) 0.50
+/- 30 0.086 0.091 2.00 0.00 (0.058) (0.002) (1.18) 0.16 0.040 (0.003) 1.17 0.29 (0.025) (0.003) (0.73) 0.17
-30/+45 0.064 0.096 1.22 0.00 (0.074) (0.055) (1.75) 0.92 0.027 0.018 0.68 0.29 (0.041) (0.053) (1.27) 0.83  
VII. Predicting Excess Returns 
Activist investors claim that their interests are completely aligned with other shareholders 
and that their campaigns maximize returns to all shareholders.  Assuming that this is true, 
investors should attempt to identify companies that are potential targets of activist campaigns in 
order to capture the positive excess returns from the initial announcement of a campaign.  To 
find predictors of companies that will yield positive excess returns, all activist campaigns with 
excess returns data were used in a least squares linear regression model.  The usable sample was 
34 companies that had faced an activist challenge in the period 2001 to 2005.  Using this data, 
the linear regression did not show a significant linear relationship between financial factors of 
the firm and excess returns.11  The lack of a relationship across different years included in the 
sample may be evidence of what some market commentators suggest is a shift in the types of 
investments made by activist investors; specifically, that activist investors have begun targeting 
larger companies.12  As recently as 2004, activist investors were focused primarily on companies 
with a market capitalization of less than $4 billion.  This has changed with high profile activist 
                                                 
11 The financial factors used in the Best Subsets and subsequent least squares model were: # of Employees, Market 
Capitalization, Cash/Total Assets, Diluted EPS, Net Income, 2-year price change in common stock, 2-year EBIT 
growth, Price/Book, P/E (Diluted), ROE, Pre-tax ROA, Stockholders Equity/Total Assets, Cash Flow from 
Operations/Total Liabilities and Percentage of shares held by the Activist Investor. 
12 James Altucher, What’s Behind Carl Icahn’s Headlines, available at www.thestreet.com May 16, 2005.  
Suggesting that activist investors are initiating campaigns in larger companies. 
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campaigns at large companies such as Carl Icahn’s recent successful battle with Time Warner 
and Eddie Lampert’s efforts to complete the Kmart and Sears merger in late 2004.13 
In order to identify key financial factors in more recent activist campaigns the sample 
was adjusted to include data on campaigns grouped by the year the campaign was initiated.  
Using this analysis, the regression model for 2005 was an effective predictor of excess returns.  
The y variable in the regression was the compounded excess returns from -5 to +5 from the 
initial announcement.  This time period was used because it captured the excess returns realized 
before the announcement as well as the initial positive excess returns in the period immediately 
following the announcement.   Using a Best Subsets analysis and the x variables used for the 
analysis of all years, the following regression model was derived:  
BXRET +/-5 (St) = 0.493 + 3.93 Csh/Assets - 0.220 Price/Book - 4.01 ShEquity/Assests 
                  + 1.45 CFO/Tot Liab + 8.65 Activist % - 0.158 2-yr Prc Chng 
                  + 0.000521 Net Inc + 0.00930 P/E (Dil) 
 
Predictor           Coef    SE Coef      T      P 
Constant         0.49337    0.08158   6.05  0.002 
Csh/Assets        3.9330     0.5948   6.61  0.001 
Price/Book      -0.21986    0.02570  -8.55  0.000 
ShEquity/Assests -4.0085     0.4250  -9.43  0.000 
CFO/Tot Liab      1.4473     0.2755   5.25  0.003 
Activist %         8.654      1.147   7.55  0.001 
2-yr Prc Chng   -0.15812    0.06998  -2.26  0.073 
Net Inc        0.0005208  0.0001091   4.78  0.005 
P/E (Dil)       0.009301   0.001437   6.47  0.001 
 
S = 0.0753487   R-Sq = 96.5%   R-Sq(adj) = 90.8% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF        SS        MS      F      P 
Regression       8  0.778190  0.097274  17.13  0.003 
Residual Error   5  0.028387  0.005677 
Total           13  0.806577 
 
Source         DF    Seq SS 
Csh/Assets      1  0.002036 
Price/Book      1  0.047251 
SEQ/Assests     1  0.123650 
CFO/Tot Liab    1  0.076496 
Activist %      1  0.069024 
2-yr Prc Chng   1  0.129101 
Net Inc         1  0.092790 
P/E (Dil)       1  0.237841 
 
                                                 
13 John Garper, Hedge Fund Agitators Deserve to be Heard, Financial Times, November 17, 2005.  
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This regression output suggests that activist investors are more likely to achieve positive 
excess returns investing in companies that provide significant liquidity from operations with a 
strong balance sheet but are priced at a discount.  Specifically, both Price/Book value and 2-year 
stock performance have negative coefficients, while Cash/Total Assets and Cash Flow from 
Operations/Total Liabilities are positive.  These coefficients are consistent with activist investors 
seeking value investments and working with management to unlock the value, often by selling a 
business line or increasing dividends and share repurchases.  Lastly, the percentage ownership by 
the activist investor had a coefficient of 8.7 significant at .1% suggesting that for a larger 
percentage of shares owned by the activist investor higher excess returns will be predicted.  In 
this analysis the share ownership percentage included shares beneficially owned by the activist 
investor and those shares held by another party that was part of a voting group with the activist 
investor.  The shares held by the activist investor also included shares that were bought 
immediately before the announcement of the activist campaign. 
This same regression model was fit on excess returns for the periods -10 to +10 and -30 
to +30.  The regression model for period -10 to +10 was similar to the period -5 to +5 although 
with a lower R2 and higher p-values for each x variable.  This is to be expected because of its 
high correlation with the -5 to +5 period.  The model for the -30 to + 30 period however did not 
show a significant linear relationship with the factors.  This is likely due to the higher variance in 
the -30 to +30 period as compared with the period immediately before and after the 
announcement.  This relationship is also consistent with positive excess returns being clustered 
in the period immediately before and for two weeks following the initial announcement. 
One relationship not reflected in the regression model was the overall relationship 
between the size of the company and excess returns.  When approaching this study a priori, 
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market capitalization was expected to be a strong predictor of excess returns with a negative sign 
to its coefficient.  This expectation was based on past experience with activist investors that 
focused on smaller companies with the idea that an activist could purchase a larger percentage of 
shares and wield more influence at a smaller company.  There are two possible explanations for 
this counterintuitive result.  First, the CRSP database does not provide information on excess 
returns for many small companies, causing a possible bias in the sample towards larger market 
capitalization companies.  Second, and perhaps more important for future activist efforts, hedge 
funds today have more capital to invest and have deployed that capital by pushing for corporate 
changes at larger companies.14 
 An area for further study in this analysis is to compare excess returns from shareholder 
actions by traditional institutional investors such as labor unions or pension funds.  Institutional 
investors have traditionally favored focusing on pushing for corporate governance improvements 
at larger companies and not seeking board seats or asset sales.  Such a comparison may show that 
traditional institutional investors are focused on larger companies and there may be less of a 
relationship between value (Price/Book and P/E) than is evident for hedge funds. 
VIII. Conclusion 
Activist investors appear to create positive excess returns at the commencement of an 
activist campaign.  Because these investors are not seeking control, but rather to influence 
management and other shareholders, the market appears to be able to discount activist campaigns 
in the days before the official announcement.  Further, activist investor campaigns provide 
positive excess returns for investors in the two-week period following the announcement.  These 
postitive excess returns are likely the result of the activist investor’s need to build public support 
                                                 
14 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Activist Investors change the Landscape; Corporate Boards Cannot Ignore them, The 
Grand Rapids Press, January 8, 2006. 
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for their campaign which will lead the investor to communicate publicly their recommendation 
to increase shareholder.  Lastly, in the limited number of activist investor campaigns by hedge 
funds included in this sample, companies with underperforming shares, strong cash flow and 
significant holdings by the activist investor are most likely to provide excess returns that exceed 
the overall average for activist campaigns. 
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Appendix A – List of Activist Investor Campaigns 
Activist Campaigns with Excess Returns Information
Year Company Activist Success Activist %
1 2001 Alltrista Corp. Marlin Partners II LP Yes 9.76%
2 2001 Computer Associates Sam Wyly No 0.50%
3 2001 Hercules, Inc. Samuel Heyman Yes 9.90%
4 2001 ICN Pharmacuticals Sp Situation Partrs and Providence Cap. Yes 4.50%
5 2001 Mayor's Jewelers Opportunity Partners Yes 9.60%
6 2001 Visx, Inc. Carl Icahn and Barberry Corp Yes 10.50%
7 2002 Aetna Inc. Providence Investors LLC No 16.80%
8 2002 Chad Therapeutics Committee to Restore Sharhlder Value No 7.30%
9 2002 Elite Pharmaceuticals The Elite Value Committee Yes 8.60%
10 2002 Kankakee Bancorp, Inc. Lawrence Seidman No 5.80%
11 2002 Tyco International Ltd Relational Investors Yes 16.00%
12 2002 United Industrial Corp. Steel Partners Yes 10.00%
13 2003 Chad Therapeutics McDowell Investments LP No 4.20%
14 2003 Dave & Busters Dolphin Ltd. Partnership I LP No 9.50%
15 2003 Equidyne Corp. MFC Bancorp Ltd. Yes 14.50%
16 2003 Hercules, Inc. Shareholders Comm for Managt No 9.06%
17 2003 JC Penney Relational Investors Yes 4.80%
18 2003 National Semiconductor Relational Investors Yes 7.00%
19 2003 Post Properties, Inc. John A. Williams No 2.30%
20 2003 Visx, Inc. Carl Ichan No 11.00%
21 2004 Alaska Air Group Steve Nieman No 0.50%
22 2004 Bally Total Fitness Corp. Liberation Investments Group Yes 5.81%
23 2004 Mylan Labs Carl Icahn Yes 9.80%
24 2004 Payless Shoesource Inc Barrington Capital Group No 1.10%
25 2004 Water Pik Technologies Tennenbaum Capital Partners Yes 19.20%
26 2005 Airnet Systems Opportunity Partners Yes 9.00%
27 2005 Beverly Enterprises Inc. Formation Capital LLC Yes 8.10%
28 2005 BKF Capital Group, Inc. Steel Partners II, L.P. Yes 16.80%
29 2005 Blockbuster, Inc. Carl Ichan Yes 9.70%
30 2005 Cenveo Burton Capital Mgmt/Robert Burton Yes 9.60%
31 2005 Cornell Companies Pirate Capital  LLC Yes 13.20%
32 2005 Kerr McGee Carl Ichan Yes 8.00%
33 2005 OfficeMax Inc K Capital Yes 6.20%
34 2005 Six Flags Daniel Snyder/ Red Zone LLC Yes 11.70%
35 2005 Sizeler Property Investors Inc First Union Real Estate Equity Yes 9.90%
36 2005 SPX Corp Relational Investors No 5.70%
37 2005 Star Gas Third Point LLC Yes 6.00%
38 2005 Temple Inland Carl Icahn No 2.00%
39 2005 Time Warner Carl Icahn Yes 6.00%
40 2005 Wendys International Pershing Square Cap/Highfields Cap Yes 10.00%  
